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This thesis explores the changing demographic picture in France 
and Germany and how it may affect U.S. national security in the near 
future. While demographics are only one set of the many forces 
driving changes in the way the United States and Western Europe 
interact and cooperate, they have the potential to fundamentally 
change the way Western Europe shapes and implements its security 
policies around the world. This thesis examines how demographic 
trends in Western Europe, particularly France and Germany, will 
affect those countries' abilities to fund and man viable military 
forces. The analysis includes topics such as immigration, 
terrorism, the importation of foreign conflicts, and increased 
nationalistic xenophobia. Finally it examines the implications 
these demographic changes will have on U.S. national security, in 
particular the willingness of France and Germany to act as U.S. 
allies and their ability to invest in defense spending. It 
concludes that while they are radically changing their force 
posture, France and Germany will continue to rely on the U.S. 
military for European security. Also, if Western Europe's social 
welfare programs are not significantly reformed, demographic forces 
will necessitate further decreases in defense spending. 
v 
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France and Germany at this time are the two strongest countries on 
the European continent, both economically and militarily. Throughout 
the Cold War, France and the Federal Republic of Germany were close 
partners of the United States. This was demonstrated most notably 
through their participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the global security situation 
has changed dramatically. There is no longer the direct threat to 
European security there was before the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Western Europe, particularly France and Germany, now sees itself as 
having a larger role in global affairs. It is important to ask, what 
type of a role will it be able to undertake and how effective will it 
be? The result will have an impact on the military abilities of the 
U.S. and NATO to act in global conflicts. 
This thesis examines Western European demographic trends, 
especially in France and Germany, and the possible effects they will 
have on future United States national security. Demographics make up 
only one set of factors in national power and strategy. This thesis 
also explores other components, related to and affected by demography, 
that affect how a nation acts: namely population composition and 
changes, social cohesion, governmental support systems and national 
and popular preferences. Demography, along with these elements, is 
driving some basic problems that Western Europeans are presently 
starting to experience and which will likely only grow worse in the 
future. 
xi 
The problems manifested at this time by the demographic trends 
are: 
* Growing social welfare costs. This is due mainly to the 
increase in the percentage of retired population and the inability of 
the European governments to bring about reforms in their social 
welfare programs. 
* Loss of international economic competitiveness. There is very 
strong opposition to any wage or social benefit cuts by the public in 
an attempt to make labor costs competitive with the international 
economic community. 
* A decrease in military-aged men, most notably in Germany. 
* Immigration problems. The populations in less developed 
nations such as Algeria and Turkey are rapidly increasing, leading to 
an influx of immigrants into Western Europe. Nationalism and racism 
against these immigrants has grown, partly because of problems in 
assimilating recent Muslim immigrants. 
* An increase in terrorism imported by the immigrants from their 
home countries. Civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East have 
spread into Europe. 
The demographic changes will affect European security and impact 
on U.S. security in the following ways: 
* Western Europeans will remain reliant on the U.S. for their 
security for the foreseeable future. Western European countries will 
not be able to increase defense spending in the future without a major 
social welfare program reform. At this time there does not seem to be 
the political will to simultaneously decrease social spending while 
xii 
increasing defense spending. 
* By restructuring their forces France and Germany will increase 
the number of troops they are able to deploy out of area, although 
this number will only be approximately 50,000 each. The number of 
combat troops will be much smaller, as this total also includes Navy, 
Air Force and Army personnel as well as all the required support 
forces. 
* France and Germany are behind the U.S. in funding military 
equipment, and their budgets are decreasing. With this decrease in 
defense spending and the long lead times involved in building up a 
military infrastructure, they will continue to remain reliant on the 
use of U.S. military assets such as logistical support and space-based 
communications and intelligence. 
* Western Europe will continue to pressure NATO to increase 
assets and resources to deal with the Mediterranean region. 
* There is the possibility that the new global orientation of 
NATO will not be a viable concept, and that it will become in effect a 
U.S. force with token European representation. The high cost of out-
of-area deployments, increased domestic pressures, and the possibility 
of minority activism will affect France's and Germany's willingness to 
take part in military operations outside of Europe. 
* Because of the lack of an overt threat against Western Europe 
and domestic pressures brought about by economic problems, European 
global objectives may increasingly diverge from those of the U.S. 
This has the potential to leave the U.S. to act unilaterally or with 
other regional allies in non-European conflicts. 
xiv 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the considerations for U.S. security in the future will be 
the United States's ability to work with and rely on its Western 
European allies. Because of decreases in the U.S. defense budget, the 
likelihood of increases in the number of potential antagonists, and 
the spread of weapons to lesser-developed countries and their 
associated growth in military strength, U.S. military power in the 
future will be increasingly tied to its allies' capabilities. 
One question for American national security is: To what extent 
will France and Germany be able to serve as reliable allies? 
Cooperative security and reliance on allies to share in the cost of 
international military operations have become important elements of 
U.S. security strategy. In this context the United States is asking 
European countries to contribute more toward their own defense and 
regional peacekeeping operations. 
This paper discusses the changes that are taking place in the 
French and German armed forces and the ability and willingness of 
those nations to take part in global operations. The big question 
Western European countries will have to ask themselves in the future 
is "whether stability in other regions, or more specifically a respect 
for the elementary principle of non-aggression, is worth fighting 
for," 1 and-- perhaps more importantly-- is it worth paying for? 
Declining birthrates has been a recent phenomenon in Western 
1Laurence Freedman, "The Future of Conflict," Jane's Intelligence Review. Year 
Book, (Coulsdan, Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1994), 5. 
1 
European countries. This development -- in combination with other 
factors such as improved health care and longer life spans -- has 
contributed to an overall aging of the populations. Western Europe is 
also experiencing two divergent trends: a drop in employment and a 
simultaneous increase in immigration and foreign refugees. Barring a 
national emergency, a national government's budget is generally 
constrained by the interplay of social, political and economic forces; 
the growing proportion of the aging population and resulting social 
welfare costs. Demographics also sets a baseline in the number of 
personnel available for military service. 
Demographics make up only one set of factors affecting the Western 
European security situation. Other components, related to and 
affected by demographics, that influence national power and strategy 
must be taken into account and are also explored in this thesis. 
These include population composition and changes, social cohesion, 
governmental social support systems, national and popular preferences, 
and the nature and severity of outside threats. 
The recent economic slowdown and loss of jobs coupled with the 
increasing costs of social programs -- pensions, health care benefits 
and welfare payments -- have in the short run caused large deficits in 
national budgets. Most governments have found it easier to reduce 
military budgets instead of the budgets of highly entrenched social 
programs. In the long run, the aging population will only exacerbate 
the problems faced now. Social spending will go up because of the 
sheer numbers of retirees, while the money available to the government 
will go down because there will be fewer taxpayers available to 
shoulder the burden. 
2 
Western European social programs are structured in a pay-as-you-go 
scheme. Because of the substantial increase in the retired 
population, these programs will eventually demand the lion's share of 
Western European governmental budgets, leaving little left over for 
defense. There is growing popular discord in France and Germany 
against any change in the social welfare programs. This not only has 
implications of the ability of those governments to pay for necessary 
improvements to the military infrastructure, but also may slow or even 
reverse future European integration measures. Thus far, all attempts 
France and Germany have taken to reduce or reform government social 
programs have been met with strong resistance. As a result, it is 
increasingly unpopular to make the cuts needed to take the next step 
in European integration -- establishment of the Monetary Union -- and 
in the end the political will to make these cuts may be lacking. 
Because of decreased fertility rates most Western European 
countries have populations that are declining, or at best, growing 
very slowly. Other, less-developed countries currently have booming 
populations. Northern Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa 
all have very high, positive population growth rates that are 
projected to continue well into the 21st century. Population 
pressures, coupled with an increase in civil conflicts throughout the 
Third World and a significant decrease in economic growth, have led to 
increases in immigrants and refugees attempting to enter Western 
Europe. Future refugee movements may become so large as to cause 
widespread disruptions in Western European countries. The potential 
also exists for civil conflicts in Africa and the Mideast to spread 
with the immigrants into France and Germany. 
3 
At a time when Western Europe is experiencing its own economic 
recession, the increase in immigration has had the effect of 
escalating nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes. The xenophobic 
activities of right-wing groups threaten to ignite an immigrant 
backlash within the host countries themselves. France and Germany 
have different ideas and criteria -- compared with each other as well 
as with the United States -- of what constitutes citizenship. The 
troubles they have had in assimilating different cultures into their 
societies have added to the confusion and anger shown by immigrant 
minorities. 
The effects of these demographic changes on the future political 
and security environments will be profound and lasting, and in turn 
will affect the United States's future security policy. These include 
changing political priorities and power bases, thus possibly limiting 
the ability of France and Germany to operate effectively abroad. 
France and Germany will also be forced in the future to interact with 
countries that have large and expanding populations. The effects of 
new technology are discussed in this thesis in relation to whether 
technology itself can overcome the effects of decreased population 
growth. 
If Western European countries cannot overcome the problems that 
will be brought about by their changing demographics, the U.S. will 
also be faced with difficult choices. If France and Germany cannot 
build and maintain military forces that will be able to act 
effectively as U.S. allies in joint operations, the United States will 
be forced to act unilaterally in certain military scenarios. While 
France and Germany are restructuring their militaries in order to more 
4 
effectively deploy a larger number of troops, the total number of 
actual combatants available to be deployed may not be enough to make 
up for the recent decreases in U.S. troop strength. Another question 
remains as to whether France and Germany will choose to militarily 
support the U.S. in out-of-region operations if they are increasingly 
oriented toward Europe. This issue may come about because of domestic 
and intra-European problems. These questions become more important if 
major conflicts are envisioned. In a future Major Regional 
Contingency (MRC), the United States will be even more reliant on 
support from its allies than during the Iraq War. 2 Without this 
support, the United States will have to decide if its national 
interests in that region are important enough to act unilaterally or 
if it has the military capabilities to intervene at all. 
2The 1996 White House National Security Strategy states "The Administration's 
defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, if necessary, defeat 
aggression in concert with regional allies in two nearly simultaneous major regional 
conflicts, has proved realistic." The White House, A National Security Strategy of 




II. THE AGING POPULATION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY 
There is an increasing shift in the makeup of Western European 
populations. Fertility rates of native peoples have gone down while 
life expectancy has increased. The populations of France and Germany, 
as well as most other Western European countries, are growing older, 
with a smaller percentage of the population composed of military and 
working-age men and women. 
While France is expected to increase in population as a whole over 
the next 30 years, the largest percentage of increase will be from 
those over 65 years of age. Germany, on the other hand, is projected 
to lose population overall, with the only increase in numbers being in 
people over 65. 3 (See Table 1.) 
The life expectancy of people in Western Europe has increased 
steadily since keeping statistics on populations was started. In 
1990, the life expectancy was 73 years for males and 79 for females. 
In the future, life expectancy for Europeans is expected to continue 
to increase slowly. 
The fertility rates (number of live births per woman) of France 
and Germany have been dropping steadily since about 1770 and 1850 
respectively, with only a short rise after the Second World War in the 
late 1940's and the 1950's. By 1989, France had a total fertility 
3William H. McNeill, Population and Politics since 1750 (Charlottesville and 
London: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 62. One difference between French 
statistics and German is that the French count children from parents of foreign descent as 
French, while Germany does not. This makes it more difficult to distinguish between 
native French citizens and citizens of foreign heritage. 
7 
rate of 1.8 and Germany's was 1.5. A total fertility rate of 2.1 is 
necessary for population replacement. 4 
Table 1 Population by age, 1985-2025 
Population in Thousands Percentage Change 
1985 - 2000 - 1985 -
1985 2000 2025 2000 2025 2025 
France 
Total 55171 58770 61805 6.5 5.2 12.0 
0-14 11763 11325 11320 -3.7 0.0 -3.8 
15-65 36499 38651 38437 5.9 -0.6 5.3 
65+ 6909 8794 12048 27.3 37.0 74.4 
20-29 8549 7857 7455 -8.1 -5.1 -12.8 
Germany (FRG) 
Total 61013 58951 52821 -3.4 -10.4 -13.4 
0-14 9263 8459 8314 -8.7 -1.7 -10.2 
15-65 42906 40474 32220 -5.7 -20.4 -24.9 
65+ 8844 10018 12287 13.3 22.6 38.9 
20-29 9890 6334 5500 -36.0 -13.2 -44.4 
Source: K C Zachariah and My T Vu World Population Projections, 
1987-88 Edition. (Published for the World Bank by John Hopkins 
University Press, 1988) 
At this time, there is no indication that the fertility rates of 
France or Germany will increase dramatically in the future. One 
description of how the situation of reduced fertility is changing 
among the demography of whole countries is given by McNeill (1990). 
4John Saunders, "Population Change in Europe: Past experience and Future 
Prospects," in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security 
(London: Brassey's, 1991), 21. 
8 
Differential birthrates among rich and poor have been 
apparent ever since modern statistics started to be 
collected; and in a sense, all that is happening in the last 
decades of the twentieth century is that this pattern has 
begun to reach across ethnic and cultural boundaries. As a 
whole nation becomes rich and urbanized, reproduction 
dwindles. 5 
Changes in lifestyles visible in Western European countries are 
also having an impact. People are generally waiting longer to marry 
and have children. "Below replacement fertility is an adjustment to 
new social and economic circumstances in which increasing levels of 
consumption of goods and services and altered individual aspirations 
have become incompatible with high fertility rates and prolonged 
population growth." 6 Children are simply not needed, or wanted, in 
large numbers, as they are in an agricultural society. It is not 
likely that Western Europe will revert back to a society that favors 
high fertility rates - at least in currently foreseeable 
circumstances. 
A. MILITARY IMPACTS 
Declining fertility rates will make it increasingly difficult for 
France and Germany to maintain their military forces at current 
levels. In the future there will be a smaller pool of manpower from 
which to draw servicemen. West Germany's 18 to 22 year old male 




year 2010. 7 Although, by 2010, both French and German 18 to 22 year 
old populations are predicted to stabilize, they will be at much lower 
levels than in the past. Collectively, the 16 nations of NATO will 
register a 12.4 percent decrease in the number of draft age males (18-
22) by the year 2000. 8 
As a reaction to the decrease in manpower, the German Army is 
already taking in personnel who would have been rejected as unfit only 
a year ago. "Defense officials say they have no choice but to lower 
physical standards and demands: This generation is less numerous than 
its predecessors, and more young men than ever-- 160,659 last year 
(1995) -- are refusing to bear arms. Instead they opt to spend a year 
as social workers" 9 Not only are there fewer men available in Germany, 
they are also increasingly less willing to perform military service. 
In 1995 the number of German men refusing to serve in the Bundeswehr 
exceeded those drafted for the first time. Claire Marienfeld, 
parliamentary ombudswoman for the armed forces, warned that within a 
few years the Bundeswehr would not be able to meet its annual draft 
quotas . 10 
In order to lure more young people into the armed forces, the 
7Gregory Foster, et al., "Global Demographic Trends to the Year 2010: 
Implications for U.S. Security," The Washington Quarterly, 12, no. 2 (April1989), 9. 
8Yves Boyer, "Demographic Change, Political Priorities and Western Security," 
in Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: 
Brasseys, 1991), 277. 
9
"Welcome To a Kinder Gentler German Army," International Herald Tribune 
(1996, Mar 28), 5. 
10
"Country Briefing, Germany," Jane's Defense Weekly 25, no. 12 (1996, Mar 
20), 24. 
10 
Germans have resorted to changing how it treats recruits. Some in the 
German Army say it is too soft on the new soldiers. Compulsory 
national service will last 10 months instead of 12. Efforts will be 
made not to send recruits too far from home: those posted more than 50 
miles away from their families will receive a monthly bonus of 
approximately 108 dollars. 11 
Without the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War, 
this would have resulted in a change of NATO's Forward Defense 
strategy, causing more reliance on rear defense and mobilization of 
reserve units. With the reduction in threat to Western Europe, the 
mass armies once seen as needed for the defense of Europe are no 
longer required. In the case of a resurgent and belligerent 
Russia/Soviet Union, large pools of manpower may again be needed. 
While this may not be an anticipated threat in the near future, 
history has shown that it is not inconceivable. 
Although the intensity of the confrontation has been 
weakened by recent events, it cannot be presumed that 
differences which have persisted so long in economic 
organization, political ideology and military alliance 
will entirely disappear in the near future, leading to a 
politically and economically homogeneous Europe free of 
the old rivalries. 12 
Military forces must not only compete for manpower, but also 
money. The aging population and decline in the numbers of younger 
workers mean that fewer workers will be available to support a growing 
11Mark Franchetti, "German Army Goes Soft to Lure Recruits," Sunday Times 
(London) (21 Jan 1996), Overseas News Section, from Lexus/Nexus. 
12Saunders, 22. 
11 
retired class. Coupled with the growing costs of social programs and 
the current lack of job creation in Western Europe, it seems doubtful 
that the military will be able to continue to spend at today's rates 
in the future. It was announced in February, 1996 by French President 
Chirac that France's military would shrink from 500,000 to 350,000 men 
by the year 2002. 13 This was, for the most part, a reaction to the 
country's $59.3 billion deficit, and the need to reduce that debt by 
1997 in order to qualify to join the common market currency by the 
year 2000. 
In France, and the rest of Western Europe, cutting spending on the 
military and its industrial complex may be easier than trying to cut 
back on social security or health insurance. In the same address that 
he revealed the French military manpower cuts mentioned above, Chirac 
stated "We are in a time when expenditures have to be reduced. We are 
no longer threatened by an external invader."14 The Western Europeans 
do not seem ready to change their social welfare systems. When the 
French government attempted to change the rules for calculating state 
railroad worker's pensions in 1995, there was a national 
transportation strike that paralyzed the country. 15 
In November 1996, it was the private sector that acted when French 
truckers barricaded roadways and brought most of Europe's road 
13French President Jacques Chirac spoke on 22 Feb 1996 in an address to 
reporters after a French governmental conference on the military. Craig Whitney, "Cold 




transport to a halt. Although the strike was illegal according to 
French law, it had strong public support and the government did not 
take any action to forcibly end the strike. The French government 
eventually made large concessions including a new retirement age of 55 
for the drivers which will be partly financed by the government and is 
lower than France's statutory retirement age of 60. 
This situation will only get worse, the French government is lucky 
that other sectors of the French economy did not jump on the bandwagon 
with the truck drivers and also demand concessions, although that 
possibility does exist in the future. Other countries, such as 
Germany and Spain, have also seen the spread of this type of anti-
austerity protesting. 
Even without earlier retirement ages, the numbers of Western 
European retirees will continue to grow, becoming a massive voting 
block, which has the potential to prevent the cutting of social 
programs simply by its size. 
B. ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Both Germany's and France's social programs have built up 
gradually over a number of years. Their governments are heavily 
involved in the funding and provision of health services, education, 
transfer payments under social security, and welfare programs. In 
Germany these social costs now stand at nearly 40 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) . If the present trends continue, German public 
pensions payments alone could account for over 14 percent of the 
country's GDP by the end of the century, swelling to nearly one-
quarter of total economic output by 2030. By 2030 public expenditures 
13 
will be close to 50 percent of GDP . 16 
All major economies, except the U.S. and Japan, rely on pay-as-
you-go public pension schemes, where those in work pay the pensions of 
the retired. "These schemes are already in deficit in the UK, Italy 
and Canada, and those in Germany and France are expected to follow 
soon. " 17 
The percentage of workers to retirees is continuously growing 
smaller. Barring any changes to the country's social spending, this 
will cause the percentage of the worker's wages going to support 
social programs to rise steadily in the future. 
The ratio of German workers to retirees in 1989 was 
4:1, by 2010 the ratio will be 3:1 and by 2030 it will be 
less than 2:1. These figures are gloomier if the under 
20 year old age group is added to the over 60 year old 
group. The ratio of workers to non-workers will be 3:2 
by 2000. By 2030 non-workers will outnumber workers. 18 
Although Germany seems to be leading the pack in reduced worker 
to non-worker ratios, the numbers for France are roughly the same, as 
seen in Table 1. 
As touched on earlier, there is much opposition to reducing the 
benefits that come from the German and French social welfare systems. 
In Germany, warning strikes were staged by public workers on May 20, 
1996 as a "planned series that union officials say will lead to a 'hot 
16Heino Fassbender, and Susan Cooper-Hedegaard, "The Ticking Bomb at the 
Core of Europe," The McKinsey Quarterly no. 3 (22 June 1993), 127. 
17Roger Eglin, "A Time Bomb Ticks Under Government Finances," Management 
Today (Jan 1994), 24. 
18Foster, et al., 9. 
14 
summer' for Chancellor Kohl - offering a measure of the depth of 
opposition to the German leader's insistence.that his compatriots must 
abandon some of their comforts. " 19 The cuts intended to reduce 
Germany's budget deficit by 33 billion dollars are in response to both 
fulfilling economic conditions for a single European currency and the 
growing sense that "welfare spending and cosseted labor forces rob 
(Europe) of competitiveness in the global economy. " 20 
One element of the huge strain on welfare benefits in France and 
Germany is a direct result of fundamental demographic changes. When 
Bismarck introduced the current pension system 100 years ago with a 
retirement age of 65, the average German life expectancy was 45 
years. 21 In 1996, the average German life expectancy is 75 years, with 
15 percent of the population over age 65. That percent is expected to 
double to 30 percent by 2030. Since Germany is seen as the "dynamo" 
of the European economy, the outcome of Germany's attempt to implement 
austerity measures may affect the rest of the European Union. 
1. Loss of International Competitiveness 
Even though a shrinking population would seem to mean less 
unemployment, this is not the case in France or Germany. In 1994 
unemployment was 12.6 percent in France, while it was 8.2 and 13.5 
19 Allan Cowell, "German Public Workers Stage 'Warning Strike' on Fund Cuts," 
New York Times (21 May 1996), C5. 
20Alan Cowell, "Germany's Leader Calls For Big Cuts in Welfare State," New 
York Times (27 Apr 1996), AI. 
21Whitney, (29 Sep 1996), A4. 
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percent in West and East Germany respectively. 22 In March of 1996 a 
combined Germany's (former East and West) unemployment rose to 10.3 
percent. 23 This is the highest jobless rate in Germany in almost half 
a century. 
Besides the fact that there are fewer jobs available, there is 
also less incentive to go back to work in Germany and France as 
compared, for instance, to the U.S. 
To illustrate the problem, take the case of a 
typical married man with two children who was employed 
at an average wage before losing his job. In France or 
Germany, he is eligible for benefits equal to more than 
75 percent of his previous net income, including family 
allowances, for a period that is in practice unlimited. 
This compares to a ratio of benefits to previous income 
in a typical state in the U.S. of 55 percent, which 
falls after three months to 28 percent. 
This helps explain why the long-term unemployed 
make up 50 percent of the European total, compared with 
less than 6 percent in the U.S. In effect, labor 
remains "parked" on the sidelines for long periods (or 
goes underground) rather than being quickly re-routed 
into another productive activity. 24 
Many economists are beginning to argue that what the European 
welfare system produces most efficiently is unemployment. Most 
people in Western Europe put the blame for rising unemployment on the 
fact that they must compete worldwide against the labor markets of 
countries that pay much less per hour. Although this is true when 
22The World Factbook. 1995, (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 
1995), 146, 160. 
23Nathanial Nash, "In Germany, Downsizing Means 10.3% Jobless," New York 
Times (7 Mar 1996), C 1. 
24Fassbender and Cooper-Hedegaard, 39. 
16 
France and Germany are compared to less developed countries such as 
those in the Far East and Latin America, European wages are actually 
very similar to those of the United States and Japan. Government 
mandated non-wage costs, generous holiday pay and high payroll taxes, 
are what separate Europe from the rest of the industrialized world. 
According to the Cologne Institute, Germany's 1991 non-wage labor 
costs for the manufacturing sector were nearly triple those in the 
Japan and U.S. 25 
Preserving existing jobs has been the top priority of Western 
European economics, although this strategy did not create new jobs. 
Between 1970 and 1990 the U.S. created 38.2 million net new jobs. 
During the same period the twelve European Economic Community 
members, with a larger combined labor force than the U.S., created 
less than one third as many jobs. 26 The result of this lack of job 
creation has been the higher European unemployment numbers. 
The only employment sector in Western Europe that has grown 
appreciably in the last two decades has been the public sector, which 
has also added to the overall tax burden, while there has been almost 
no growth in private sector employment. 27 Table 2 shows that jobs 
were lost in 1992, even though the economies grew and in 1993 the job 
loss percentage exceeded the decline in economic growth. 
The job loss is continuing. In Germany, a number of economists 
25Joel Haverman, and Norman Kempster, "The Case of the Disappearing Worker: 
What's Gone Wrong?" Los Angeles Times (6 July 1993), 1. 
26Fassbender and Cooper-Hedegaard, 127. 
27Haverman and Kempster, 1. 
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attributed the increase in unemployment to 10.3 percent in 1996 to "a 
stepped up campaign by companies to slash their employment in this 
country (Germany), and build plants outside Germany. " 28 
Table 2 Economic Growth (%) vs. Job Growth (%). 
1992 1993 
Country Growth Jobs Growth Jobs 
Germany +2.0 -1.7 -1.9 -2.4 
France +1. 3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 
Source: Los Angeles Times, July 6, 1993 from Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
The employment problem in Europe is made worse by government 
regulations that act as disincentives for the hiring of new workers. 
These include heavy payments for health insurance, pensions and 
unemployment insurance. There are also such strong regulations 
protecting employees from being let go that companies only hire 
personnel when there is no other alternative. 29 Many studies have 
come to the conclusion that if Europe really wants to create more 
jobs it must become more like the U.S. "The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) analysis is that it 
must free its labor markets, lighten the burden of the welfare state 
and give freer rein to venture capital. In short it must become more 
28Nash, C3. 
29Craig Whitney, "Europe Isn't Divided in its Joblessness," New York Times 
(31 Mar 1996), E4. 
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entrepreneurial. " 30 There are two problems however: doing that is 
very unpopular with many European workers, and it will take time to 
become effective, if it can be implemented at all. 
In October 1996, Germany's fight over changes in the workplace 
shifted from a political discussion to actual bargaining between 
labor and management. An initial hard-line stance taken by three 
companies -- Daimler-Benz, Siemens and the General Motors 
Corporation's Opel subsidiary-- planned to take advantage of a new 
German law and immediately cut their workers sick pay by 20 percent 
without negotiating new contracts. One week after the companies' 
pronouncements, following Union protests where more than 100,000 
workers took part in demonstrations and walkouts, the companies 
retreated and decided to open new contract talks with the metal 
workers' union. One factor that may have forced management to the 
bargaining table is the ardent opposition by workers to decreases in 
benefits. During the protests "many workers carried signs saying 
that they would rather fight like the French did last year than 
SUbmit tO 'American' WOrker benefitS 1 Which they deem inferior. " 31 
Beyond maintaining their sick-pay benefits, the union is insisting on 
a 4.5 percent pay raise --more than twice the rate of inflation. 
France is again bracing for worker unrest in 1996, including a 
repeat of the two week national transportation strike that brought 
30Reginald Dale, "There Is No 'Third Path' for Europe," International Herald 
Tribune (5 Apr 1996), 17. 
31Edmund Andrews, "New Hard Line by Big Companies Threatens German Work 
Benefits," New York Times (1 Oct 1996), A1. 
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most of the French economy to a standstill in 1995. 32 In large part 
because of the economic policy of increased fiscal austerity, Prime 
Minister Juppe's conservative government is growing in unpopularity 
and faces defeat in France's 1998 elections. The French Public 
Opinion Institute released one poll showing 83 percent of the voters 
in favor of a change in economic policy. Other public opinion polls 
show support for government economic policies are below 30 percent. 33 
If the conservative government were to lose the upcoming elections, 
France's attempted social welfare austerity measures will be seen as 
at least partly responsible. In any case, Politicians will be forced 
to think hard before they try to cut social programs again. If 
social programs can not be decreased other portions of the government 
budget may be reduced instead. So far, the military has been shown 
to be the budget that is easiest to cut. 
2. Implications for European Integration 
Western Europe's fiscal problems-- which are showing no signs 
of getting better and are caused in part by the aging populations and 
its associated social welfare programs -- may lead to a 
dissatisfaction with the further integration of the European Union. 
Further social program austerity measures, such as are seen in Europe 
today, have the potential to lead to popular alienation with the 
Maastricht Treaty and cause a reversal of the integration process. 
32Craig Whitney, "France Braces for Yet Another Autumn ofLabor Umest, 
Strikes," New York Times (29 Sep 1996), A4. 
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As seen in the recent German labor protests, a steel worker in 
Germany does not seem ready to give up his social welfare package in 
the name of Germany, much less to help pay price supports, for 
example, to a tuna fisher in Malta, something which could become a 
reality if Europe were fully integrated. Increasingly, Europeans are 
seeing the EMU as leading toward decreasing blue collar jobs and 
social benefits while increasing taxes. In Austria and Germany where 
social welfare programs are generous and strongly entrenched, 
increasing numbers of people believe that any new government 
austerity measures will attempt to cut those entitlements before 
anything else. 34 
"The United States sees a European Monetary Union (EMU) as 
carrying a high risk of contributing to recession and thus political 
trouble, which has always been expensive for the world."35 The 
countries of Europe had a hard time passing the Maastricht Treaty 
five years ago in national referendums. If the Treaty leads to 
increased economic hardship, popular support could be eroded to such 
an extent that it will become politically untenable to continue the 
process. This would, in turn bring about an increased tendency 
toward nationalism and decreased cooperation between Western European 
countries. 
In October 1996, the Austrian Freedom Party won 28 percent of the 
34Alan Cowell, "Austria Vote: No to Europe," New York Times (15 Oct 1996), 
A9. 
35Rudi Dornbusch, "Euro Fantasies," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1996), 
123. 
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vote in elections for the European Parliament legislatures. 36 The 
Freedom Party which appealed to the working class, ran an anti-EU 
campaign, saying that the EU would lead to the export of Austrian 
jobs and the importation of immigrants who either take away work or 
live on welfare. 
In France the popular support for the government's economic 
policies has fallen below 30 percent. Even some of Chirac's own 
party members are unhappy with his austerity measures. 37 It is also 
likely that an anti-EU theme may be used by some of the more extreme 
parties in the next election campaign. This would, at the very 
least, increase the visibility of the anti-EU aspect of the political 
debate, perhaps leading to more popular support. 
Officially Germany would like to see European integration 
continue, although knowing that they are one of the linchpins for 
further integration, Germany seems to be increasing its role on 
deciding how it will continue. "There have been hints from Germany's 
Christian Democrat ranks to other members of the European Union that 
Germany might pursue foreign policy aims of its own if European 
integration doesn't continue as Germany would like. " 38 Since France 
sees itself as the unofficial leader of the European integration 
process, this would increase the friction between the two largest 
36Cowell, (15 Oct 1996), A9. 
37Whitney, (29 Sep 1996), 11A. 
38Christian Caryl, "Remember: No Goose Steps," U.S. News & World Report 
121, no. 16 (21 Oct 1996), 56. 
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economies in Europe, France and Germany, and add to the problems that 
already plague any further economic integration. 
C. IMMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE 
Today's largest migrations to Western Europe are largely tied to 
historical relationships between the sending and receiving countries. 
It is not always close proximity that decides which country migrants 
will end up in. France's former colonies in Northern Africa are one 
example of a relationship between countries leading to migration; 
another is Germany and Turkey, which were in close political 
alignment up to and during World War I. 
In France, the more recent pressures for immigration control are 
in conflict with historical colonial benefits that were given to the 
colonized nations in the past. "After the cold war, the former 
colonial powers no longer had any reason to maintain commitments in 
their old spheres of power. They no longer have to defend the 
colonies against a competing power (the Soviet Union) . " 39 
The fast growing populations of Second and Third World countries 
have fed the growing migration to Western Europe. The people of 
poorer countries see greater opportunity and a better life outside 
their own increasingly overcrowded countries. Three main reasons for 
migration to Western Europe are the differences in wealth between the 
regions, the pressure of population, and the effects of civil war, 
famines or natural disasters. 
39Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt, Migration and European Integration: the 
Dvnamics of Inclusion and Exclusion (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1995), 6. 
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During the 1950's and 1960's workers from the Third World were 
happily received by France and Germany to help drive the post-war 
boom. "This 'golden age' of post-war economic growth came to an end 
in the recession of 1974-75."40 
In the 1960's, there was an increase in investment and 
development in the Third World, helping growth in less developed 
countries. Since the 1980's, with the advent of official, treaty 
regulated economic blocks, there is a general movement of monetary 
capital to three main regions. The three regions are North America 
(NAFTA), Western Europe (EU), and East Asia. Although there is 
growing investment in the Third World, specific countries are being 
bypassed as recipients of investment. Foreign investment to Third 
World countries has tripled in the past five years, but these foreign 
investment flows remain highly selective. Most goes to Asia, the 
Pacific rim and Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa has received only 
about three percent of all investments. 41 Since the end of the Cold 
War, there is no need to subsidize countries to ensure they do not 
fall into the communist camp. Investment is therefore now more 
aligned toward economic profit. 
The average annual change in per-capita GNP for the Middle East 
and North Africa was a negative 2.4 percent between 1980 and 1991. 42 
Increasing Third World unemployment will continue driving people to 
40Richard Mayne, ed., Western Europe (New York and Oxford, England: Facts on 
File Publications, 1986), 505. 
41Paul Lewis, "Cutting Back in West, Corporations Invest in 3d World," New 
York Times (13 Mar 1996), C4. 
42Miles and Thranhardt, 19. 
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attempt to migrate to industrialized nations, although now there is 
also a lack of jobs at their destination, Western Europe. 
The coming population increases in North African and Middle 
Eastern countries, coupled with the lack of opportunities, will also 
fuel the attempted immigration to Western Europe. While the 
forecasted population growth of Europe for the years 1991 to 2000 is 
0.5 percent, it is projected that Turkey's population will rise to 
100 million during the same time period. By the year 2020, the 
African continent's population is expected to more than double. 43 
France and Germany are attempting to limit immigration and have 
succeeded in drastically reducing the numbers of people they grant 
asylum to. Germany has reduced the number of asylum applicants by 
around 90 percent, and new, tougher asylum rules were adopted by the 
European Union (EU) in 1993. Included now is a resolution proposed 
by the French in November 1995, that persecution by non-state agents 
Algeria's Islamic terrorists for instance -- does not count. 44 
The problem is that many countries find that it is harder to keep 
determined people out than it might seem at first glance. As Robert 
Kaplan puts it: "Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash the 
borders, bringing their passions with them. " 45 However, even if 
Europe is more successful than in the past at keeping unwanted 
immigrants out, which may be doubtful, the foreign populations will 
44
"Go West and North If You Can," Economist 238, no. 7948 (13 Jan 1996), 52. 
45Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 
(Feb 1994), 62. 
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still grow larger as a proportion of the total population. This is 
because Europe's immigrants currently have a higher birth rate than 
non-immigrants. 46 
Civil wars, strife and disasters are other reasons for 
migrations. "Paris is fearful that a huge influx of refugees, up to 
500,000, would flee to France if the Islamic Fundamentalists take 
over in Algeria." 47 Western Europe has already seen more than 800,000 
refugees from the former Yugoslavia, many granted "temporary" asylum 
in Germany. 
1. Racism/Nationalism vs. Assimilation 
Increases in nationalism and xenophobia within the host states 
can be explained not only by a rise in the number of insecure 
individuals who feel threatened by foreigners, but also by a growing 
perceived threat to the security of the collective identity. 48 
One way the security threat is driven by the actions of the host 
countries is the behavior and policies of both official and non-
official entities against the immigrant populations. Xenophobic 
rhetoric and activities tend to cause minorities to unite and form 
defensive organizations. These immigrant groups may then be further 
isolated from the host society and harder to assimilate. 
46Mayne, 505. 
47Lara Marlowe and Thomas Sancton, "Faith's Fearsome Sword," Time 143, no. 6 
(7 Feb 1994), 49. 
48Gabrial Sheffer, "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security," Survival36, no. 1 
(Spring 1994), 64. 
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There are host societies which tend to accept new cultures and 
assimilate them more easily than others. France and Germany are very 
different when they are compared by this yardstick: who is allowed to 
join the society and how is this accomplished? 
a. Differences in Ass.i.mil.a ting New CU1. tures 
The "native citizens" of France and Germany have different 
ideas of what makes a Frenchman or a German respectively. In France, 
culture defines the meaning of being French. To become a member of 
France's society one must become French culturally. Historically, 
there seems to be no bias against original ethnicity or skin color in 
this area. In a view that seems to reflect the way many French 
think, whether left or right politically, French anthropologist 
Emanual Todd argued against Muslim girls wearing veils in school: 
"The message to Muslim girls must be: we want you to become French 
like the rest, so you can marry our sons. We must tell the children 
of immigrants that it is good to become French. " 49 
Toward the end of the 1960's the French government started to 
argue that it could no longer maintain an open-door policy with 
respect to immigration. After World War II, France was seen as a 
nation where immigrants were welcome and would be easily 
assimilated. 50 Now, the migration flows have changed from a largely 
intra-European mix to an Africa-to-France pattern. "The 'cultural 
49Bruce Wallace, "The Islamic Peril," Macleans 107, no. 48 (28 Nov 1994), 47. 
50Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation. Immigration. Racism and 
Citizenship in Modem France (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 73. 
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proximity' of the previous immigrants, which facilitated the process 
of assimilation, is contrasted to the 'cultural distance' of the new 
immigrants, which hampers assimilation and threatens social 
cohesion. " 51 
Germany has a quite different idea than does France about what it 
means to be a citizen. In 1913, a law was passed that allowed 
citizenship only to those with German blood. German law today does 
not exclude the possibility of citizenship for non-Germans, although 
those who can prove German descent can become citizens quickly. 
"Citizenship can be withheld indefinitely from a Turk who has lived 
decades in Germany, paid taxes dutifully and speaks perfect German. 
Or it can be granted in a flash to a Russian of German descent whose 
forefathers left 300 years earlier but can't even order a beer in the 
native tongue."~ 
Although, historically the German nation has been made up of a 
highly homogeneous population, 53 it may be slowly changing. Charges 
that citizenship laws are racist have pushed the German government to 
promise to pass laws making it easier for non-German residents to 
obtain citizenship. 
One point which both Germany and France agree on, in the area of 
citizenship, is that they do not want people with divided loyalties 
in their countries. At the moment French citizens are allowed to 
511bid., 73,74. 
52 John Marks, "A German's Lot is Still an Exclusive One," U.S. News and World 
Report 118, no. 16 (24 Apr 1995), 48. 
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have dual nationality, and many of the three million Algerians living 
in France do so. However, the French government is worried about 
whether the immigrants' first allegiance is to Islam or France. In 
Germany, the government may make new citizens relinquish their old 
passports. Also, during the citizenship law debates, the German 
parliament said it will pay special attention to the question of 
whether a person can be a citizen of two countries at once. 54 
b. Rise in Xenophobic Pol.itical. Movements 
Fears that immigrants are taking away the native workers' 
jobs, that they will undermine of social cohesion and order, increase 
cultural divisions, and cause increased crime and terrorism have 
fueled national-level prejudices in France and Germany. Both 
countries have seen the growth of right-wing groups in the government 
and apart from it. These groups, in a way, provide their own self-
fulfilling prophesy. Whether they are violent or non-violent, their 
actions have the effect of angering and frightening the immigrant 
communities. This causes backlashes from the immigrants, and may 
provide some of the reasons for the growth of militancy where there 
were none before. "Prejudice is the greatest friend of extremists, 
says a Pentagon terrorism expert. The more anti-Islam sentiment that 
is expressed, the more it will drive people into the arms of 
extremists. " 55 
54 Ibid. 
55Elizabeth Neuffer, "'Islamiphobia' in Europe Fuels Tensions, Isolation," Boston 
Globe (20 Jun 1995), 1, from Lexus/Nexus. 
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France's right-wing groups are more organized than Germany's and 
are largely aligned with the political party of Jean-Marie Le Pen's 
National Front. Le Pen won 15 percent of the nationwide vote in the 
1995 French Presidential elections. 56 His platform promised to "send 
the immigrants back where they came from to make room for three 
million unemployed French workers. " 57 
Charles Pasqua, a former French Minister of Interior, "believes 
that Islamic terrorists are the true threat to the Republic. " 58 After 
the 1994 killing of five French officials in Algiers, he announced 
heavy policing in areas inhabited by large numbers of Muslims. 
"Critics of Pasqua's policy argue that he does not differentiate 
between militant Islamic parties that are responsible for killing 
foreigners in Algeria and those parties which condemn the killing. " 59 
They feel Pasqua's approach invited reprisals and the possible 
movement of the fight to French territory. In December 1994, 
Algerians did just that: four Algerian hijackers took control of a 
jetliner in France. The Algerians had planned to blow up the jet 
over Paris with 170 people aboard, until French commandos stormed the 
plane and killed all four of the terrorists. 
A recent poll released by the French National Human Rights 
56Craig Whitney, "Europeans Struggle to Balance Old Ways with New Muslim 
Immigrants," New York Times (6 May 1995), A4. 
571bid., A5. 
58Wallace, 46. 
59Frances Ghiles, "Unease Inside Moslem Paris: How Immigrants are Coping with 
a Clampdown," Financial Times (1 Sep 1994), 3. 
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Commission underscores racial tensions in France: 71 percent of those 
polled believe Islamic extremism is too widespread in France's Muslim 
community; 62 percent said there were too many Arabs in France. 60 
Right-wing parties attack Muslims for "stealing jobs from the local 
populace and also for having children at such a fast rate they would 
outnumber Europeans. " 61 One problem that is currently being brought 
up in France is the issue of polygamy practiced by African 
immigrants. In the current anti-immigrant mood the government is 
taking a hard line stance. The government has said it will only 
recognize one spouse and consider other marriages annulled. 62 
This also has implications for the heavily indebted social 
welfare system. France pays for health care, education, and 
subsidies for children and pregnant women, regardless of their 
marital status. It is estimated that in the Paris area alone, 
200,000 people live in polygamous families. 63 
Compared to France, Germany has no cohesive right-wing movement 
or ideology under one dominant leader. 64 There is evidence that neo-
Nazi groups were making efforts for greater coordination among 
themselves in 1994, although this has been tried unsuccessfully in 
6<N euffer, 1. 
61 Ibid. 
62Marlise Simons, "In France, African Women are Now Fighting Polygamy," New 
York Times (26 Jan 1996), A1. 
63Ibid., A4. 
64Andrew McCathie, "Germany: Not all Gloom in Germany," Australian 
Financial Review (29 Oct 1992), 18, from Lexus/Nexus. 
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the past. 65 Even though the extreme right-wing groups in Germany are 
not organized at this time, they do keep in contact through magazines 
and local meetings. 
After reunification, Germany saw a surge in violence, mostly from 
right-wing groups. In 1992, an average of three people a day were 
injured and between January and November, 17 people died as a result 
of the violence. 66 The Turks in Germany now face several kinds of 
violence including firebombing by militant Kurds as well as attacks 
by right-wing extremists. 67 
In 1991, 36 percent of Germans voiced sympathies for right-wing 
groups whose programs emphasized action against foreigners. 68 Some 
Germans say that the government authorities have also shown 
astonishing patience with these groups. 69 1992 was the year with the 
highest number of violent anti-immigrant incidents, and this caused 
65U.S. Department of State, "German Human Rights Practices, 1994," Country 
Reports (1 Feb 1995), Section 5. 
66A. Juhnke and A. Sivanandan, "The Hydra-Headed Monster of Germany; Rise 
of Right-Wing Violence," New Statesman & Society 5, no. 231 (4 Dec 1992), 12. 
67Marks, 48. 
68Douglas K.lusmeyer, "Aliens, Immigrants and Citizens: The Politics oflnclusion 
in the Federal Republic of Germany; Extremism as a Result of Conflicting Efforts to 
Create a National Identity," Daedalus 122, no. 3 (22 Jun 1993), 81. 
69There has been more than one incident of German police standing idly by as 
extremists attacked the homes of immigrants. The government did not speak out 
against anti-immigrant actions and instead focused on reducing immigrants by 
tightening asylum procedures and border controls. They attempted to decrease the 
level of conflict by keeping the prospective victims out of the country. Juhnke and 
Sivanandan, 12. 
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the government to finally end their inaction. 70 Only in 1993 did the 
German government start acting strongly against the right-wing 
groups, mostly by prosecuting more cases of right-wing violence and 
imposing longer jail sentences after convictions. Although the 
German government outlawed four extremist parties, this only "causes 
the movements to change their letterhead." 71 It is estimated that 
right-wing voter potential may be as high as 15 percent, and the 
potential still exists for increased violence. 
2 . Terrorism 
One of the most visible security issues linked with immigrants 
is terrorism. The threat of terrorism on French soil because of the 
Algerian war has become real. "Tracts circulated in Algiers quote 
the armed wing of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as 
saying that 'the war against France has become a legal obligation'." 72 
Although most of France's Muslims remain moderate, authorities are 
convinced that there is a growing minority that is influenced by 
religious extremists. France has over 3000 Muslim groups, most very 
benign, although there are extremist ones, including a militant 
Algerian group, which promises urban guerilla war if France does not 
embrace Islam. 
Children of immigrants who feel rejected and repressed by the 
70T. Kielinger and M. Otte, "Germany: The Pressured Power," Foreign Policy no~ 
91 (22 Jun 1993), 50. 
71Juhnke and Sivanandan, 12. 
72
"Fundamentally Confused," Economist 334, no. 896 (7 Jan 1995), 41. 
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host country could also be targeted by militants. "Many young 
Muslims in ghettos are rejecting the model of Islamic communities 
that have integrated into European nations. A few want urban warfare 
to press demands for respect and opportunities. " 73 Immigrant ghettos 
may become breeding grounds for terrorists. Racial clashes are 
increasing, unemployment is up to 40 percent for some immigrants and 
usually at least 10 percent higher than the native population. 
"In France, a day spent in the concrete corridors of Mantes-la-
Jolie illustrates the combustible mix of unemployment and despair, 
prejudice and lack of identity that makes Europe's Muslim Ghettos a 
likely target for Islamic extremists wishing to recruit for their 
cause. " 74 Immigrants, some excluded from society and others rejecting 
integration into the host nation, may feel there are no prospects for 
the future. They no longer have ties to their parents' home country 
and many an individual could turn into "a young rebel in search of a 
cause, culture and country, a desperate militant with little to 
lose." 75 Gabrial Sheffer points out that terrorist activities are 
only the tip of a much larger iceberg of activities by stateless 
diasporas. Sheffer defines ethno-national diaspora as social and 
political entities that arise from migration. Stateless diasporas 
would be, for example, the Kurds in Germany and the Algerian Islamic 
militants in France. "The communities these groups establish in a 
73Mort Rosenblom, "Europe's Melting Pot Boils Over with Racism, Extremism, 




host nation develop trans-state networks which serve to transfer 
resources that support irredentist, secessionist or national 
liberation movements. " 76 
France used the "absolute emergency act" in 1994 to allow the 
government to bypass the usual judicial procedures on the grounds of 
state security. The French deported an Algerian national who was an 
engineer at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) . 
He was accused of "actively supporting the forwarding and 
distribution of material destined for armed groups in Algeria. " 77 On 
the whole, efforts by host countries, coalitions of host countries 
and even international organizations, such as Interpol, to contain 
these networks have been futile. 
a. ~ortation of Foreign Con£2icts 
Both France and Germany have complex relationships with 
the minorities in their countries. There have already been many 
attacks in Germany by one group of immigrants against another. "Some 
two million Turks live in Germany, splintered along the same notions 
of identity that are increasingly dividing Turkey's 60 million people 
into camps of Alawites, Islamic fundamentalists, secularists and 
Kurdish separatists. " 78 Both ethnic Turks and Kurds believe that 
76Sheffer, 64. 
77Declan Butler, "Scientists Support Expelled Researcher," Nature 372, no. 6501 
(3 Nov 1994), 5. 
78Allen Cowell, "Bonn Fears Turks' Strife will Spread," New York Times 
(27 Mar 1995), A6. 
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Germany is favoring the other. On March 27, 1995, Germany suspended 
military arms sales to Turkey in protest of its campaign against the 
Kurds in Northern Turkey. This, along with the reluctance of Germany 
to expel Kurds convicted of crimes or refused asylum, has caused some 
Turks to believe that the German government is supporting the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PPK) . 79 Kurds, on the other hand, cite Germany's 
outlawing of the PPK and prior sales of weapons to Turkey as showing 
that the German government favors the Turks. To add to the 
confusion, "the Turkish military coup in 1980 sent hundreds of 
Turkish extremists, both rightist and leftist, fleeing to Germany and 
elsewhere in Europe, where police officials say, they have formed 
well organized groups. " 80 Germans are also concerned that as Turkey 
becomes increasingly fundamentalist in nature, the more Turkish 
problems and conflict will be imported to Germany. 
France faces a possibly worse situation in Algeria. The Islamic 
fundamentalists are not only targeted against other immigrant 
populations in France, but also against France itself. As was noted 
earlier, the outlawed Islamic Salvation front (FIS) is calling the 
war against France a legal obligation. 81 French citizens in Algeria 
are already prime targets, and 21 were killed in 1994. Three million 
people of Algerian heritage live in France, and many have come in 
illegally or overstayed their visas. 
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during the Algerian War before France gave Algeria its independence. 
Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris mosque and France's leading 
Moslem cleric, told the French newspaper Le Monde that "the French 
could soon see in every Muslim a potential terrorist ... We are afraid 
of the return of the climate during the Algerian war. " 82 Baubakeur 
spoke those words only four months before terrorists highjacked the 
jetliner in Marseille, France, in December 1994. 
D. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FUTURE POLITICAL/SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS 
Western Europe's demographic changes will have consequences for 
the future political and security environment. With the Cold-War 
over, there will be both popular and political pressure on the 
government in an attempt to guarantee that domestic problems assume 
the highest priority. This will likely lead to changing political 
priorities brought about by domestic conflict and changes in the 
power base. Both these factors -- domestic conflict with the 
xenophobic right-wing violence and immigrant problems and power base 
changes with the increase in a larger voting block of older people 
can be seen taking place in Western Europe today. These same 
factors, particularly the increase in active minority groups, can 
also limit the ability of a country to perform military operations 
abroad. 
A country that is relatively rich, such as France or Germany, 
cannot expect to isolate itself from encounters with other 
comparatively poorer countries in the same region, such as those in 
82
"Deja Vu," Economist 332, no. 876 (13 Aug 1994), 45. 
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North Africa or Eastern Europe. "Growing populations do not 
voluntarily leave their neighbors alone and at ease within existing 
economic, political, and social frameworks. " 83 This can be seen by 
the steady flow of illegal immigrants into France and Germany from 
neighboring regions. Even though Europe is in an economic recession, 
it is comparatively well off when measured against North Africa and 
Eastern Europe. 
While France and Germany do not necessarily fear a military 
attack by these countries any time in the near future, 
destabilization in those regions will lead to massive movements of 
war refugees and the increased probability of conflicts being 
imported into Western Europe. Some countries, such as France, are 
looking to advanced military technology as a way to make up for 
decreased manpower, although there may be limitations to the type, of 
operations which can be attempted and overall effectiveness of the 
forces. 
1. Changing Po1itica1 Priorities 
With the increase in domestic problems such as right-wing 
violence, immigrant agitation, and imported civil strife, combined 
with a lack of resources, there could be a forced shift in 
governmental priorities. There is likely to be increased attention 
to domestic problems to the detriment of foreign affairs. 
Important issues, such as the lack of economic growth in Third 
World countries and the population increases in Africa, which will 
83McNeill, 51. 
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only fuel the push for immigration to Western Europe, may be ignored. 
Domestic problems may swamp the political process, preventing long-
term policy innovation to deal with problems at their source and 
relying instead on knee-jerk reactions. 
2. Changing Power Bases 
As it stands now, a major power base change will take place in 
the near future, in both France and Germany. The older generation 
will gain more power because of the increase in the overall 
percentage of people over the age of 65 with an additional increase 
by the lowering of the retirement age, in some cases to age 55. This 
is likely to have a major impact on political decisions. One effect 
may be that it could become practically impossible to cut social 
spending, especially in the areas of pensions and health care. 
Another change in the power structure might come from the 
increase in numbers of second- and third-generation immigrants. 
Even if all immigration were cut off as of today, because of the 
higher relative fertility rates of the immigrants already in France 
and Germany there would be an increase in the percentage of the 
immigrant groups as compared to the host population. Although the 
immigrants will not, in the foreseeable future, become a majority, 
they may compromise a large voting block. If their numbers grew 
large enough, they could force the governments to include them in 
political decisions. How this could affect the nation would depend 
on how well these children of immigrants are assimilated into the 
culture of the host state. 
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3. Limited AbiJ.ity of a Country to Operate Abroad 
The increase of active minority groups, whether religious, 
ethnic or political, could limit the ability of France and Germany to 
operate in other countries. There is also the possibility that this 
minority could become a popular majority in certain situations. 
Western European countries may not want to get involved in 
regions where the European public sees no immediate security 
concerns. There were feelings expressed in France (predominately 
espoused by Le Penn's National Front) that Iraq was a far away 
country and Kuwait was a problem between Arabs, for Arabs to solve. 
Any conflict could lead to large public opposition if more than a few 
casualties were taken with no clear and convincing security interest. 
Operations far from Europe will also be very expensive, perhaps 
leading to increased budget stresses. These factors could lead to 
loss of public support and include much of the main stream population 
in the future, not only the extreme edges. 
Social cohesion is an important factor when fighting wars with 
limited aims. "Cohesion in any society will be threatened by a war 
which is being prosecuted unsuccessfully, or incompetently for 
purposes which are either obscure or barely taken seriously by public 
opinion. " 84 The farther away these wars are from horne and the less a 
direct link can be made to national interests, the harder it will be 
for a government to maintain social support for the use of troops. 
This, perhaps also combined with an active minority group against the 
84Lawrence Freedman, "Demographic Changes and Strategic Studies," in 
Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Security (London: 
Brassey' s, 1991 ), 17. 
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military action, will cause domestic dissension and decreased support 
by the public. 
France serves as the home to more than three million Muslim 
immigrants and Germany has large numbers of increasingly Islamic 
fundamentalist Turks. Whether from the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism or as a backlash against right-wing nationalism, there 
is an increase in militancy in Europe's Islamic populations. This 
could be further intensified if the Moslim populations are not 
assimilated into the host society. 
Algerian fundamentalist groups have forced France from the 
government's original hard line support of the military regime in 
Algeria. Also, Germany seems to be walking a tightrope between the 
Turks and the Kurds. 
During the Gulf War France saw surprisingly little sectarian 
friction although there were large anti-French demonstrations in the 
Maghreb towns of Rabat and Algiers. This racial calmness was "thanks 
notably to the studied carefulness of the government and the leaders 
of the Islamic Community. The countries of the Maghreb were 
overwhelmingly pro-Iraq, which is why France made sure that it was 
seen as trying harder than others to arrive at a peaceful settlement, 
until the eve of Desert Storm. " 85 The question is, can this 
arrangement with the Islamic leadership last, and what are the 
implications of "never discounting Islamic views in policy-making" 
going to be for the U.S. in the future. A feeling for the future can 
85Francois Heisbourg, "France and the Gulf Crises," in Gnesotto, Nicole and 
Roper, eds., Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, 
1992), 19. 
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be gained by France's refusal to allow U.S. military aircraft to 
overfly French territory during the Libyan strike, and its non-
support of the September 1996 U.S. air strikes against Iraq. 
An increase in terrorism is a factor that already affects France 
and will also become more of a concern for Germany in the future. 
Because of its Second World War history, Germany has not normally 
taken a strong position in foreign affairs. Now, with reunification 
and the end of the Cold War it has found itself in a new situation, 
that of having to play much more of a part in world politics, 
including sending troops abroad. This will increase Germany's 
chances of becoming a possible terrorist target in the future. 
Germany has seen Turkey's internal problems spreading into Germany 
itself. With its increasingly global interests, Germany may be 
targeted by organizations or countries that are in opposition to its 
policies, much like the U.S. and France are now. Germany may be left 
out in the cold if France declines to get involved in potentially 
divisive conflicts that affect Germany but not France. In this 
situation, there is a chance that another country such as France will 
not risk the problems that will come with siding with Germany. 
In future foreign conflicts the increase in the militancy of 
Western Europe's Muslims (or other alien groups) could lead to worse 
strife than seen up to now. The conflict does not need to be an 
armed confrontation; it could be something as benign as an economic 
embargo of another country. If the opposition within a country is 
severe enough to make foreign conflict not worth the trouble, it 
could cause the war to be lost at home. 
All Western European countries are faced with immigration 
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pressures of some sort that show no sign of abating. Alienation of 
these minorities because of the economic and nationalistic pressures 
is a real possibility. "The clash of cultures that some have 
predicted for the next century may not take place at the frontiers 
where the cultures meet, but rather, as events in France suggest, 
inside the borders of the Western states.u86 In the Western Europe of 
the future, there is a distinct possibility of clashes not only 
inside the nation as Viorst suggests, but also on the borders. 
4. Declining Population Countries with Expanding Populations 
on Their Borders 
Population growth south of the Mediterranean Sea will continue 
to increase well into the 21st century, while at the same time it 
will slow north of the Mediterranean. 
By 2015, there will be 3.1 million births each year 
in the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia. The number of births in Spain, France and 
Italy at the same time will be 1.6 million. 
In the same North African countries the number of 
children under the age of 15 will rise from 24 million 
in 1985 to 45 million in 2015. In Spain, France and 
Italy the numbers are 32 million in 1985 decreasing to 
25 million in 2015. 
In Egypt and Turkey alone have as many births per 
annum (1.8 million each) as the 12 countries of the EU. 87 
This demographic vitality of the North African and Middle Eastern 
countries should cause the Western European countries to attempt to be 
proactive in their foreign policies and security arrangements. The 




rise of fundamentalist Islam in these areas will only complicate the 
problem. "The image of conflict between the rich North and the poor 
South, bursting with excess population, is overstated if only because 
the South is not a coherent political grouping and is incapable of 
organizing itself as such. The prospect is not of a global 'class 
struggle' -- perhaps taking over from the Cold War -- but a series of 
localized and painful encounters."88 
Western Countries have historically been embarrassed in guerrilla 
conflicts where population differences did not make a big difference. 
Public sentiment regarding the ability to absorb casualties and 
miscalculations of their adversary's abilities to do the same were 
elements that helped lead to the outcomes of France's conflicts in 
Vietnam and Algeria and the U.S. experience during the Vietnam 
conflict. 
With the exceptions of the "grand purpose"89 wars, World Wars I and 
II, the ability to tolerate casualties has changed in western 
democratic countries in the twentieth century. "A certain tolerance 
for casualties was congruent with the demography of preindustrial and 
early industrial societies, whereby families had many children and 
losing some to disease was entirely normal. The loss of a youngster 
in combat, however tragic, was therefore fundamentally less 
unacceptable than for today's families, with their one, two, or at 
88Freedman, 288. 
89Edward Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 
(May/June 1995), 113. 
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most three children. " 90 
Because of this adverse reaction to casualties, western countries 
may have trouble facing societies that are driven by ultra-nationalism 
or religious fanaticism. In today's world-- and for the foreseeable 
future -- countries and societies that tend to have intense beliefs 
also tend to be undeveloped and have high-birthrates. Another 
difference is the cost of training, outfitting and supplying a 
professional soldier in a modern army. Both politically and fiscally, 
there is a very large disparity between losing one soldier from a 
developed country and one from a less developed society. 
For conflicts that better fit the western idea of war, the 
evidence is that numbers alone do not make the difference. Prior to 
the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein stated what was also on many U.S. 
military planner's minds, that Iraq could win because the Iraqi people 
would accept many more war casualties than the Americans. 91 While the 
U.S. led coalition still had to put troops on the ground, in this 
instance technological superiority was used to great effect. The Gulf 
War may have been a unique war in that it was very badly fought by 
the Iraqis. However, the larger question is whether it is premature 
to conclude that mass armies are a thing of the past. 
There are three avenues that the countries of Western Europe can 
use to prevent conflict between themselves and more populous countries 







In the diplomatic area governments can seek to limit high 
technology weapons from spreading to these areas. One example of this 
is the Missile Technology Control Regime of 1987 to avoid the spread 
of ballistic missiles with ranges above 300 kilometers and capable of 
delivering a nuclear warhead. 92 Another diplomatic process would be to 
cultivate good relations with the target countries. This process 
would have to include economic aid and cooperation in an attempt to 
help the other country grow economically. 
Military means could be to invest in force-multiplying weapons 
(discussed in more detail in the next section). 
Cultural methods would include active measures to assimilate 
immigrants in the country. If the immigrants are brought into the 
society of a host country, they will be less likely to act against 
that society. 
5. Effects of New Technologies 
One question brought up by this discussion is "Can new technology 
overcome the effects of decreased population growth?" It stands to 
reason that if one country has higher technology weaponry it should be 
able to act at greater ranges than its opponent and with more 
lethality. It should also be able to do this with fewer people. One 
good example of this was the British ability to overcome much larger 
populations during their colonial period. 
France is currently interested in "providing its military units 
with greater strategic mobility and long-range precision weapons, 
92Boyer, 274. 
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although this is for limited interventions in Africa, the Middle East, 
and Eastern Europe, not because of planning for a major war in 
Europe. " 93 Military experts are also looking at high technology 
weapons systems as being able to provide highly effective military 
strikes without the political dilemmas associated with nuclear 
weapons. 94 By increasing their reliance on high technology weapons as 
a way to remain militarily effective with fewer personnel, countries 
such as France and Germany must plan for the support and maintenance 
of the force involved. 
In World Wars I and II, countries saw an increase in men needed to 
support each division of combat troops as the technology improved. In 
WWI a divisional slice was 60,000 men. That is for 15,500 combat 
troops an additional 34,500 supply and support men were needed. In 
WWII the divisional slice increased to 65,000 men. 95 While the combat 
effectiveness was raised as technology increased, likewise, the number 
of support personnel involved also grew. Today in NATO, the combat 
slice as a percentage of overall forces is even smaller and while its 
combat effectiveness has also grown higher than in the past, the 
percentage of support forces are comparatively larger. Presently 
there are no new technologies that could affect the number of support 
93David Yost, "France," in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti, eds., The Defense 
Policies ofNations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins 
University Press, Third ed., 1994), 249. 
941bid., 250. 
95Brian Bond, "Demography and War: A Military Historian's Perspective," in 
Freedman and Saunders, eds., Population Change and European Securitv (London: 
Brassey's, 1991), 201. 
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forces needed by the military. 96 
As the number of combat personnel declined, numbers of maintenance 
people grew in order to service the ~igher technology weapons. 
"Already in the United States Air Force 28 percent of the enlisted 
personnel are used for maintenance duties. " 97 If this is the case with 
the next generation of technology, France and Germany would be forced 
to field smaller forces with more lethal weapons, which may lack the 
necessary support to be a fully effective and sustainable fighting 
organization. 
6. Military Manpower 
Different missions that may be faced by western countries in the 
future will also affect the number of personnel needed. High 
technology may not be able to change the fact that a large military 
presence is needed in certain operations such as truce enforcement and 
area occupation. Examples of this today are Northern Ireland and 
Bosnia, with Iraq as an example that might have happened if different 
decisions had been made. 
The ratio of soldiers + police : to population in 
Northern Ireland was roughly 20:1000. When the number of 
active opponents in Northern Ireland (estimated at 1500) 
was taken into account the ratio dropped to 20:1. Where 
local military forces are stronger and more capable than 
Northern Ireland, the 20:1000 ratio would be 
insufficient. 
Solder to space ratios are also relevant. 
Nevertheless, the Northern Ireland ratio of 20:1000 would 
suggest a minimum peacekeeping force of 90,000 soldiers 
96Boyer, 277. 
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be used to police the Vance-Owen plan in Bosnia. It also 
suggests that NATO forces in Bosnia today are too weak to 
enforce the political provisions of the Dayton accords, 
particularly the return of refugees to their former 
homes, if the warring parties do not implement them 
voluntarily. 98 
Using the British experience in Northern Ireland as a basis for 
comparison with the U.S.-led Western coalition in Iraq, an estimate 
can be made of the number of personnel needed to occupy that country 
after the Gulf War. Iraq, with its population of 20.6 million people, 
would have required at least one-half million occupation troops at the 
20:1000 ratio. Even if this occupation force was halved to 250,000 
men, it is very doubtful whether the Western countries would have been 
either able to man or willing to pay for this operation. 
Once assembled, this force must also be moved to the area, re-
supplied and in most operations, eventually rotated back to the home 
country with different replacement troops taking their place. These 
logistical operations will also be more complicated in undeveloped 
countries such as Rwanda or Somalia. 
Two other options to increase total numbers of forces are to 
attempt to assimilate other demographic sectors, such as women and 
immigrants, into the armed forces or rely more on Ghurka-type forces. 
Women are already being integrated into some European forces although 
there are certain countries that have not, such as Germany and 
Britain. At the very least, if used only as support and staff troops, 
female personnel could greatly increase the pool of possible forces in 
98Barry Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," International Security 
21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 105. 
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the future. 
France already has Ghurka-type forces with the Foreign Legion, 
although they only constitute a relatively small percentage of the 
total force. "Using a combination of options, France or Germany could 
use prospective immigrants, who renounced their national allegiance, 
attracted by an offer of citizenship after a period of service."99 
Edward Luttwak has proposed the same type of arrangement for the U.S., 
although for different reasons . 100 Besides bringing numbers of 
personnel into the forces, this could perform the task of assimilating 
immigrants into the country. 
By actively attempting to bring immigrants into its armed 
services, France and Germany would give young immigrants a chance to 
overcome the high unemployment that currently is seen in their 
populations. This would also allow for more rapid assimilation into 
the national culture for the people chosen. A person coming out of a 
nation's military will have a greater chance of being more patriotic 
toward that country, be better educated, more likely to accept the 
native culture and, perhaps most importantly, pass the culture along 
to his/her children. While this is not an end-all solution; it will 
benefit the nation by assimilating immigrants, the military by 
increasing available manpower, and immigrants as a way out of high 
unemployment. 
99Edward Luttwak, "Where are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 
July/Aug 1994), 28. 
100In what he calls an improbable scheme, Luttwak proposes that the U.S. might 
use Ghurka or other nonnative troops to overcome the U.S. aversion to casualties. 
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III. IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY 
POLICY 
There are two areas where the demographic changes detailed in the 
preceding chapter may have implications in Western European countries 
taking part in military operations alongside the U.S. and acting as 
allies. One is their willingness to take part in "out of area 
operations" because of internal or external political considerations. 
The other is their ability to contribute to military operations within 
the constraints of military forces and assets available for use. 
The 1996 National Security Strategy states: "The Administration's 
defense strategy, which requires U.S. forces to be able to deter and, 
if necessary, defeat aggression in concert with regional allies in two 
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, has proved realistic. " 101 
The addition of the statement "in concert with regional allies" is new 
to the U.S. national strategy and reflects a growing realization that 
with its smaller force posture the U.S. may not be able to handle 
larger regional contingencies alone. The U.S. is therefore planning 
on its allies to contribute forces. 
In a time of general emergency, such as war, countries will do and 
spend whatever they have to, to oppose a direct threat to their 
survival. In Western Europe today, there is no external menace that 
directly threatens the security of any NATO ally. With their current 
budget problems, neither France or Germany can justify keeping large 
101The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement," 4. 
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land armies to oppose a defunct Soviet Union. The rise of a newly 
belligerent Russia has been briefly discussed. In Europe there is 
currently not enough support for this scenario as a reason to keep the 
armed forces at their Cold War levels. 
As Western Europe focused on fighting the USSR in Europe during 
the Cold War, its capabilities for mounting flexible operations 
throughout the globe decreased. While Europe relied on large land 
armies -- and in the case of France and the UK a nuclear deterrent 
important elements that make up a truly global force capable of power 
projection were left out. These elements include logistics, strategic 
troop transport, global communications networks, space based 
intelligence assets and even medical evacuation capabilities. These 
components were not needed if the battle would take place in or near 
Western Europe. There was also no need to spend the money on these 
assets if the United States was providing them to alliance partners as 
needed. 
The Soviet collapse, coming as quickly as it did, caught France 
and Germany with large land armies configured for mass war on the 
European Continent. 102 Add this to the internal problems of need for 
increased social spending because of an aging population and the 
expectation of a peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. There 
will inevitably be many different ideas about where the government 
should spend its limited resources. 
Although France, Germany and Britain are working to restructure 
102Sherard Cowper-Coles, "From Defense to Security: British Policy in 
Transition," Survival36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 143. 
52 
their military forces, they are also cutting significant amounts of 
both manpower and money from their services. The fiscal decreases 
will have an especially negative effect on the ability of those 
countries to build a significant power projection force. This leads 
to the conclusion that multinational units such as the Eurocorps will 
remain ineffective or at the best, still almost wholly reliant on U.S. 
support. NATO officials believe that without a major U.S. role, the 
Western Europeans will only be capable of simple peacekeeping or 
constabulary missions in the foreseeable future. 103 
NATO is also moving toward changing its mission to include out-of-
Western-European-area operations. If this continues to be the case, 
NATO will need forces that are able to react to extra-European 
contingencies. They will have to be able to move to the conflict area 
quickly, have the capability to resupply -- perhaps with an extended 
logistical tail, perform as an effective fighting force, provide 
intelligence and rotate in fresh troops -- as needed -- in case of an 
extended operation. Additionally, this may have to be done with a 
minimum of U.S. support, if available assets are already engaged 
supporting U.S. or other allied troops, in that particular conflict or 
for another contingency. Presently it does not seem likely that 
France or Germany will be able to afford the military expenditures 
that would make out-of-area military action without U.S. assistance 
possible. 
103R. Atkinson and B. Graham, "Allies Look Impotent Without U.S., NATO 
Says," International Herald Tribune (30 Jul1996), News Section, from Lexus/Nexus. 
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A. DEFENSE SPENDING IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
Since 1990, NATO's European members have been cutting their 
defense budgets. On a percentage basis these cuts have been less than 
U.S. defense cuts. Of the $470 billion spent on defense in 1995 by 
all 16 alliance members, the U.S. defense budget still accounted for 
59 percent, or $278 billion . 104 While this leaves Western European 
countries still spending a large amount on defense, their continued 
need to rely on U.S. support is a function of how their money is 
spent. 
In 1995 the United States spent $35.4 billion on 
,defense research and development, or 14 percent of the 
Pentagon budget, compared with $13.6 billion spent by 
European NATO countries combined, or 8.3 percent of 
their collective defense budgets. For some allies, 
including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Turkey, such spending was either nil or nearly so. 
Over the last decade, the United States also 
devoted a larger portion of defense expenditures to 
equipment purchases - about 25 percent - than any of 
the allies. Some European powers have substantially 
reduced their spending in this area . 105 
Cuts in nonmilitary spending already have spawned massive domestic 
protests in Europe. But deferring the goal of defense independence by 
cutting military spending provokes little opposition. "It is true 
that you have some countries in Europe that are completely relying on 
American protection and have abandoned any idea of their own defense, 
a French defense official said. They have paper headquarters and 
104Atkinson and Graham. 
105Ibid. 
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paper amies. " 106 
The French experience in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, its largest 
out-of-area troop deployment in more than 25 years, had a large impact 
on their security policy. Since General Charles de Gaulle returned to 
power in France in 1958, France has put great emphasis on being seen 
as a world power. After Gulf War, France realized that it could not 
continue to remain a world leader with a Cold War amy . 107 This can be 
seen in France's willingness to reduce both its manpower requirements 
and the funding to its nuclear deterrent forces. 
The French military budget plan caps annual spending on the 
military at Ffr185 billion per year in 1995 Francs, (35 billion 
dollars) for the years 1997 to 2002. It will also limit annual 
equipment spending to $16 billion, a cut of about four billion dollars 
a year . 108 Investing in new and additional equipment -- transport, 
communication and intelligence -- is an integral part of reshaping a 
predominately land force into a global force. By cutting their 
equipment budget, France will not be able to achieve its goal of 
regaining its status of being a global power. 
Gemany's 1996 defense budget is being cut by DM 1.25 billion 
($750 million) to DM47.1 billion, further cuts to DM46 billion are 
106Ibid. 
107Heisbourg, 18. 
108David Buchan, "French Cabinet Approves Defense Cuts: Chirac Aims to Create 
Professional, More Cost-Efficient Model Forces," Financial Times (14 May 1996), 2. 
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expected in 1997. 109 In its first non-UNmilitary operation outside 
its own country, Germany is faced with finding DM700 million to pay 
for the Bundeswehr operations in Bosnia. This is a large amount in a 
decreasing defense budget of DM46 billion for a comparatively small 
number of troops (4000) and for a short time. This leads to the 
realization of the problems Europe's largest economy would have if it 
were to contribute substantial forces, perhaps one division or even 
more, to an Iraqi-like operation. If current trends continue, a 
larger deployment of troops by Germany would also lead to increased 
debt or reductions in other government programs. 
B. PROBABLE FORCE POSTURE EVALUATION 
When available force numbers in Western Europe are taken and the 
support troops -- training, logistics, medical, and other support 
forces -- are accounted for and subtracted from the total, the number 
of actual deployable forces is greatly reduced. An estimate at this 
time would give Western European countries only 4 to 7 division 
equivalents (NATO) that could be rapidly and capably deployed away 
from Europe. The breakdown would be roughly: UK - 1 division, Germany 
- 1 to 1.5 divisions, and France - 3 divisions. 110 This number, of 
109
"Front Line Safe As Germany Cuts Defense by $750m," Jane's Defense 
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actual deployable forces, includes the support personnel incorporated 
in those deploying forces which would further decrease the number of 
combat troops available. 
Western European governments are in the process of changing their 
defense policies. During the Cold War the main, if not only, mission 
of Western European military organizations was primarily to defend 
Western Europe. With a few exceptions - UN missions, Falklands War, 
and Northern Africa - the military roles did not include out-of-area 
operations. When there was a need to unilaterally use military forces 
out of area, European governments had to scrape forces and equipment 
together. They also were reliant on certain U.S. assets such as 
logistics and satellite intelligence. "The only wars France has 
successfully handled on its own in recent decades have been minor 
interventions in Africa, and U.S. logistical support has been 
necessary even for some of these interventions."111 In the Gulf war, 
French troops were praised for successfully completing their missions, 
although "analysis by French experts and opposition politicians note 
that the missions assigned to the French forces were circumscribed in 
advance by the limitations of French military equipment and by the 
relatively modest size of the French units deployed to the Gulf."112 
France's 1992-94 draft military program-law states that the third 
of three principle missions assigned to the armed forces is "to be 
Heer fur neue Aufgaben"' .. .ins Presseforum (6 Feb 1996), from BMVg online at 
www.bmvg.government.de\presseforum. 
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able to conduct operations outside of Europe. The French retain a 
great -- and understandable -- reluctance to conceive of the 
possibility of a major war in Europe, and most discussion concerns 
possible limited interventions in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern 
Europe."u3 
European military roles are currently in transition to include 
more emphasis on out-of-area mission planning. Britain's 1992 white 
paper unveiled three new overlapping roles for the armed forces: to 
ensure the protection and security of the UK and its dependent 
territories, even when there is no major external threat; to insure 
against any major external threat to the UK and its allies: and to 
contribute to the promotion of the UK's wider security interests 
through the maintenance of international peace and stability.u4 
French Prime Minister Alain Juppe has proposed a European Army of 
350,000 troops and that it should be subordinated to the European 
Union for rapid reaction-type roles. 115 In this model, each of the 
major European military nations -- France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK-- would provide between 50,000 and 60,000 men. These rapid 
reaction troops would ultimately be under the Western European Union, 
which, in turn, many European politicians want to be controlled by the 
European Union. 
France is in the process of restructuring its armed forces, 
1131bid., 249. 
114Cowper-Coles, 147. 
115Marc Rogers, "The IGC: Committed to Creating a Common Foreign 
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including ending compulsory service, possibly giving it a more mobile 
and rapidly deployable force. France's military will go from 500,000 
in 1995 to a planned 350,000 in 2002. The bulk of these cuts will 
come from the Army which will lose an estimated 96,000 personnel. 
"This will result in a third of France's 124 regiments being 
disbanded, leaving many towns and regions to face economic decline. 
Critics argue that the threat of labor unrest could easily temper the 
governments enthusiasm for standing down regiments and closing 
factories, compromising Chirac's timetable for change."116 
France's current nine divisions will also be disbanded, and 
reorganized into four separate forces consisting of an armoured group, 
a mechanized group, a rapid armoured intervention force and an 
infantry assault force. 117 The objective of this French military 
reform is for France to be able to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 solders out 
of the European region. 118 As of 1996, France's most easily deployable 
force was the Foreign Legion with 8,500 men. "We had to beg, borrow 
and steal from 47 separate regiments to put together a 15,000 man 
intervention force during the war in the Persian Gulf, said Pierre 
Lellouche, a conservative member of the French parliament."119 
However one analyst noted: 
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The biggest problem the Europeans face today is not 
the size of their forces, but the fact that they can't 
move them where and when they need them, said a NATO 
planner in Brussels. Every mile you move away from the 
continental Europe, the dependency on the United States 
increases - for transportation, for logistics, for 
command and control, for a lot of other things. In a 
way, they've become more dependent on the United States 
than ever . 120 
The growing call on France's combat manpower has meant that a 
small number of elite troops have been almost permanently mobilized in 
different theaters for years on end. The French debate of Bosnian 
intervention, at times calling for unilateral French action was 
tempered by former Chief of the General Staff Maurice Schmitt using 
The Military Balance to argue that the former Yugoslav army was bigger 
and better equipped than that of France. 
In the future, the French are going to rely on their Rapid Action 
Force based in France to fulfill the duties formerly allotted to the 
locally based troops. 121 In another economy measure caused by cuts in 
France's military budget, the number of French troops in Africa will 
be decreased by more than half. This will leave in place only 5,500 
of the 12,500 troops now permanently stationed in Africa. These 
troops were placed in Africa under long-standing bilateral defense 
pacts between Paris and its former African colonies. 122 This may cause 
France to have to eventually back out of a number of these military 
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121
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accords. 
By French law, draftees cannot be sent overseas against their 
will. In the past, when asked, only one in six draftees agreed to be 
deployed overseas. This resulted in France's 240,000 man army being 
less employable for overseas deployments than a significantly smaller 
all professional army of 100,000. 123 It remains to be seen how many of 
these deployable troops are actual combat troops as opposed to support 
forces. Also, the one question that nobody seems to be asking is what 
would happen if the deployment is longer than anticipated. What 
troops would be rotated in to replace the original forces? The answer 
to the second question will most likely be: If the mission is 
important enough to them, either they will scrape up enough soldiers 
from home-based units -- as happened initially in Iraq -- to replace 
those on deployment, they may simply be forced to leave the same 
troops in place, or they may withdraw. 
Germany is concerned that France's plans to end conscription and 
turn its army into an intervention force will leave Germany as the 
only NATO member with a military force large enough to defend its own 
territory. Germany is worried that the French are relying on them to 
protect France in the case of a European conflict, at least in the 
early stages, until France can re-institute the draft. This has 
caused Germany to rethink plans for expanding military co-operation 
with France in favor of a reorientation towards the U.S. and 
123Whitney, (23 Feb 1996), Al. 
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Britain. 124 
German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, says that Germany does not 
wish to pursue a strategy that would allow it to deploy a large number 
of personnel to world trouble spots. Contrary to that statement is 
the fact that Germany, which is also reducing its armed forces from 
370,000 to 338,000 solders in peacetime, is planning on restructuring 
its forces to include a 53,600 man crisis reaction force. The main 
difference from France is that Germany will maintain the draft, which 
will enable it to build up a mobilization strength of an estimated 
500, 000 men. 125 However, out-of-area operations are very different 
from territorial defense. Procurement of assets for a rapid reaction 
force will not be cheap. If Germany is going to continue its 
conscription policy thereby maintaining its main defense posture, it 
may have to eventually decide which mission is more important, main 
defense or rapid reaction, and which one will get the money . 126 
One sign that Germany has already made that decision is the 
reduction of its heavy forces. Under the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE) Germany is allowed to have 4,166 Battle Tanks. 
With the current downsizing, Germany only needs and can only man 
124Robin Gedye, "Bullying Rises in German Army," The Daily Telegraph 
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approximately 3, 07 4 tanks, including reserves . 127 
Until 1994, German forces had been barred from operating outside 
of the NATO area. In 1994, Germany's Constitutional Court 
reinterpreted the Basic Law, 128 leading to deployment of German Troops 
abroad. Germany is showing signs of increased participation in global 
politics which has included deploying troops to Somalia and Bosnia. 
Prior to the court's reinterpretation, most citizens and politicians 
believed that Germany could not deploy troops outside of NATO's 
boundaries. A February 1996 report by Ruehe stated that "Germany is 
no longer threatened by a land attack but faced regional conflicts in 
and outside Europe that could undermine its security. Germany's armed 
forces must gear up to become capable of playing a full role in 
international military missions by the year 2000."u9 
Britain will cut Defence expenditures by 26 percent in 1996/97 
compared to its 1985 amount. There will also be reductions in its 
regular uniformed personnel, falling from 326,000 in 1985 to 240,000 
in 1996. "By 1995 Britain will lose a tenth of its destroyers and 
frigates, all of its diesel submarines, more than a quarter of its 
infantry battalions, two-fifths of its armoured regiments and about 
127Jahrlicher Informationsaustausch uber Verteidigungsplanung, Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (1996), 4. 
128This was not a change in the Basic Law, only a change in understanding it. 
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one quarter of its aircraft. As Sir Michael Quinlan might have put 
it, versatility will have prevailed over mass - but at the price of 
lower levels of readiness, sustainability and the ability to rebuild 
major formations. 11130 
Britain, of all the Western European countries, is the best 
equipped to provide forces in overseas engagements. 131 It was the 
largest European contributor of manpower in the Gulf War with 35,000 
troops in theater. Britain was also the first major military power in 
Western Europe to start restructuring their forces in order to be able 
to move troops rapidly on a global level. However, "almost every 
commentator seems to agree that the British government will not get 
through the decade without having to make more painful decisions about 
which of Britain's quiver full of Defence capabilities to keep and 
which to abandon. 11132 
Italy is also restructuring its military. "The current 
restructuring process of its armed forces is essentially driven by the 
dire crises of its public finances, and not so much by the requirement 
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C. FRANCE AND GERMANY AS U.S. ALLIES 
NATO is changing from an alliance for the defense of Western 
Europe to one of global collective defense, promoting wider interests 
around the world. In today's changing security situation Western 
European countries find themselves more reliant than ever on the U.S. 
to provide these military assets which would allow them to act 
globally. In addition, with their budget problems, Western European 
countries are hard put to build up these same capabilities in order to 
become both militarily self-sufficient, in the case of a European 
Defense Initiative, and ensure that the U.S. will be able to rely on 
them to provide what is increasingly seen as their share of the global 
security responsibility. 
France has long seen itself as a global power. During the Cold 
War Europe was forced under the U.S. protective umbrella by the Soviet 
threat. France's desire to rejoin a NATO, reformed to give Europeans 
more weight in how it functions is a reaction to the changes since the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the renewed global influence Europe 
could have if it had the ability to project power outside Europe. 134 
The German Army reorganization also reflects the changes since the end 
of the Cold War, with a growing emphasis on contributing forces for 
out-of-area NATO and WEU operations and supporting UN peacekeeping and 
hurnani tarian operations . 135 German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkle 
stated: "in the long run, it is neither in the American nor the 




something flares up somewhere. " 136 
The U.S. has worried that if there were a viable European defense 
entity it could draw troops away from their NATO commitment. The 
French view the Eurocorps and other new European multinational forces 
as providing the core elements for a European Security and Defense 
Initiative (ESDI). France is increasingly calling for a European 
military capability that would be able to protect European interests 
without U.S. control. "This is despite the fact that no Western 
European democratic politician has the slightest chance in the 
foreseeable future of generating public support for the measures 
needed to replace the U.S. contribution to Western security. " 137 
In July of 1992 the Western European Union (WEU) set up a naval 
task force in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargo against Serbia. 
This WEU force was separate from the NATO naval task force which was 
executing the same mission, and was evidence of competition in the 
responsibility of providing security in Europe . 138 Although, While 
NATO took over operational control of this task force in 1993, the 
French idea of a military entity separate from NATO is still alive. 
It has only temporarily taken a back seat because of Europe's failure 
to handle the conflict in Bosnia and the decline in military spending 
and manpower in virtually all of Western Europe. 
"The French drew two conclusions from the setbacks to their 
136Erlanger, A5. 
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European aspirations. First, the U.S. and NATO appeared increasingly 
necessary not only to maintain Western Europe's collective defense 
capabilities, but also to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War 
crises that France initially believed Europe could handle on its 
own. nl39 
While Western Europe's intent is to build a military capable of 
acting without large amounts of U.S. support, the difference between 
the two seems to be widening. "I see the writing on the wall that 
there could be an ever widening gap, which at the end could be very 
decisive, said General Klaus Naumann of Germany, who chairs the NATO 
Military Committee. This disparity can be seen in the size of the 
forces, the money devoted to defense research and procurement, the key 
capabilities of movement, intelligence and logistics, and particularly 
in technological acumen." 140 
Since the end of the Cold War, both Germany and France see 
themselves as having a larger role in NATO military operations. They 
also want Europe to have a larger say in NATO affairs. By changing 
their force structures from large land armies focused against the 
Soviet Union to smaller forces able to deploy significant numbers of 
troops abroad, (50 - 60,000 men) France and Germany are facing up to 
two facts. The first is that they can no longer afford to maintain a 
large land force in the absence of the Soviet threat. The second is 
that if they want to play a integral part in global affairs in the 
future they must have flexible reaction and intervention forces that 
139Ibid., 63. 
140 Atkinson and Graham. 
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are able to deploy and respond to trouble spots around the globe. 
Another factor that will affect French and German abilities to act 
as U.S. allies may be their ability to operate without overseas 
staging bases. Overseas bases may not be as readily available as 
during the Cold War. Transport and logistics will become even more 
important with the pulling back of forces to the continental United 
States as well as the decreasing number of foreign countries that will 
allow foreign troops to be stationed on their shores. There is an 
increasing number of countries that see American bases on their soil 
as impinging on their sovereignty. 141 France and Germany's lack of 
power projection capabilities leads to the conclusion that in regions 
with no allied military bases available, they will be reliant on U.S. 
assets to conduct the initial assaults. 
D. WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 
With the end of the Cold War, Europe has found itself with no 
major threat to its security. Since the Second World War, the Soviet 
Union was the main force that caused the close cooperation between the 
United States and Western Europe for the last fifty years. 
Something approaching a united 'West' has been 
spoken of only three times in modern history: in 1917-
18, 1941-45 and the Cold War years. In the first two 
instances, the term was a complete misnomer, since the 
enemies - Germany and Austria-Hungary in the first 
case, Germany and Italy in the second - were full-
fledged members of the West. The conflicts were more 
accurately described (and, indeed, they sometimes have 
been) as Western civil wars. 
141David Yost, "The Future ofU.S. Overseas Presence," Joint Forces Quarterly 
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But if one stretches the point and allows all three 
as examples, it becomes clear that the notion of a 
political 'West' is one that has been attractive to 
Europeans only when some or all of their countries have 
been in great and imminent danger . 142 
With no major enemy to unite against, will the cross Atlantic 
interaction come to an end or will the cooperation that was learned 
during the Cold War continue? 
With the Cold War over, other factors may emerge, driving a 
decline in this cooperation between Western Europe and the U.S. and 
even between the European countries. Europe is being pushed to build 
a strong union to be able to compete economically and militarily on a 
global scale. With the changes taking place after the Soviet Union's 
collapse, it remains to be seen if European integration forces are 
stronger than individual nationalism and interests. If European 
countries are unable to reach the high level of integration that is 
envisioned, the EU may not provide the stability needed for a united 
European defense. 
One piece of evidence that the cooperation between the U.S. and 
Europe is declining is that Western Europe is actively talking about 
having a military capability independent of the United States. While 
the actuality of this may be along way off - and there is opposition 
mostly from the UK - it is an aim that the U.S. can not discount. 
When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, for 
example, the immediate reaction of Jacques Delors, president of the 
European Commission, was "We do not interfere in American affairs. We 
1420wen Harries, "The Collapse of 'the West'," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (Sep/Oct 
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hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours. " 143 
European dependence on the United States ensures that Washington 
has a strong voice in where and why there will be armed intervention. 
In some eyes the U.S. merely switched from nuclear hegemony to 
conventional hegemony, which unlike during the Cold War now includes 
France. Some French are also irritated because they perceive that the 
U.S. attitude is one of wanting the French military to be strong, but 
only for use in NATO missions, not in order to build up a separate 
European defense identity. 144 
Even if the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) is not 
realized, there will be internal political pressures that may cause 
one or more Western European countries to opt out of certain U.S. 
operations. The subject of internal opposition and how it may limit 
the ability or willingness of France and Germany to operate abroad was 
discussed in the preceding chapter. As was mentioned before, a few 
causes may be minority activism or terrorism, such as may occur 
because of European-based Muslim opposition to Middle East actions or 
popular opposition because of there being no perceived European 
security interest. Other reasons may include the taking of high 
casualties or the high monetary cost of some missions. 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S./WESTERN EUROPE MILITARY BURDEN SHARING 
The recent changes to the security environment, coupled with 
less money available because of growing social programs will mean that 
1431bid., 49. 
144Atkinson and Graham. 
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future defense spending will continue to come under pressure to remain 
static or even decrease further. This will adversely affect France 
and Germany's ability to build up their defense infrastructure. It 
will also bring any attempt by the U.S. to increase France and 
Germany's percentage of the military burden under intense scrutiny. 
Increasing military spending in today's situation, would take money 
from other programs and may lead to strong public pressure against any 
move of this type. Because of the changing demographics, increase in 
domestic problems, and lack of an overt outside threat to their 
national security, many Europeans may not see a need to increase the 
money transferred to the U.S. 
F. ABILITY TO INVEST IN JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE 
While Economic and demographic trends will affect French and 
German abilities to provide funding for their militaries including 
sending forces abroad, the same can be said for the United States. 145 
If the U.S. does not have the excess equipment capability to loan to 
its allies and Western Europe does not invest in equipment, what is 
the outlook for it integrating with U.S. forces if needed? 
With 360 million people, it seems that Western Europe should have 
much more military power than it does when compared to the United 
States' 240 million. Although the U.S. has reduced its military 
spending since 1990, it still accounted for 36 percent of the world 
total of military spending in 1994. This is in contrast to the rest 
of the NATO countries which combined accounted for 20 percent of world 
145Yost, (Summer 1995), 74. 
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spending. 146 
France revised its defense equipment acquisition budget in August 
1995, reducing it an average of 15 percent each year between 1997 and 
2002. Under the spending plan Ffr516 billion ($101 billion) will be 
set aside for procurement, effectively a steady Ffr 86 billion per 
year .147 
By moving from a conscript army to a professional one, France may 
actually decrease the amount of money it can spend on equipment. "We 
estimate the operating costs of a career army could eat up 70 percent 
of the entire defense budget, leaving just 30 percent for equipment. 
This compares with the 50:50 split between operating cost and hardware 
at the moment. " 148 
The end of conscription in France cannot be addressed with-out 
looking at its economic impacts. Compulsory military service will not 
be ended until 2001 mostly because the government fears that any 
abrupt halt would throw too many youths on the labor market, 
aggravating the unemployment level, which stands at nearly three 
million. 149 There is also the effect it will have on the French 
defense industry. The increased operational costs of a professional 
146
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army will decrease the amount that can be spent on equipment. The 
decrease in the amount spent, at mostly French firms, is estimated at 
approximately 20 percent of the total defense budget or eight billion 
dollars. This is despite the fact that French defense firms are 
already heavily in debt. "Their common problems are insufficient or 
even negative equity, heavy debts, top-heavy work forces and slim 
order books. However, the government, committed to spending heavily 
on social programs, does not have the funds to bail them out. " 150 
"The insufficiencies were generally not specific to France, but 
more often than not shared by her European partners: e.g. no 
sufficient long-range heavy transport aircraft; a very limited in-
flight refueling capability (France managed to deploy 7 tanker 
aircraft in Saudi Arabia, whereas more than 200 were deployed by the 
US); a dearth of organic heavy armour and artillery in French power 
projection forces. " 151 The French Cold War procurement decisions are 
being felt today. With France forced to drastically change its 
military structure and with no decreases in other government 
expenditures seen, the French taxpayer will come under an increasingly 
high tax burden. 152 Francois Heisbourg states that because of 
obsolescence of large numbers of French weapons systems and over-
ambitious procurement programs that have created heavy budget 
obligations has resulted in France being the "only western country 
150J. Lewis, "State Firms Drowning in Red Ink," Jane's Defense weekly 24, 




which had to forego any appreciable peace dividend between 1986 and 
1992. " 153 This statement would most likely be refuted by the other 
western countries who have seen high budget deficits and a lowering of 
money available for defense. For most countries the peace dividend 
meant mainly defense cuts. Defense expenditures were generally 
reduced because the money was not available, not because western 
countries chose to make do with a smaller military. 
The U.S. reduced its defense expenditures for the most part 
because it became politically unable to continue higher spending with 
the end of the Cold War coupled with high national debt. Besides 
continuing its high social spending, Germany has to continue to fund 
its reintegration with former East Germany. Italy feels it did not 
receive a peace dividend because of its public finance problems and 
the need to upgrade its military forces. 154 Britain is also finding it 
necessary to reshape its forces with the consequence of not receiving 
a peace dividend. 
"In these conditions, trade-offs will be exceptionally painful. 
Not only will there be little or no peace dividend, but enhanced 
mobility and its logistical and intelligence accompaniment will come 
dear. Therefore, the trade-off could come in the form of particularly 
deep redUCtiOnS in force Structure and equipment holdings. nlSS 
For budgetary reasons France may continue to have the same 
deficiencies as was seen during the Gulf War. Current plans tend to 
153Ibid. 
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support this position. "Defense Minister Charles Millon, confirmed 
that there would be no funding for development of the Future Large 
Aircraft. " 156 Although there are plans to buy 52 Lockheed Martin C-
130J's, these aircraft are more tactical/in-theater supply as opposed 
to a C-5 type strategic/global lift aircraft. Germany's 1996 defense 
budget is being cut by DM 1.25 billion ($750 million) to DM47.1 
billion, which has caused it to postpone four transport aircraft and 
four transport helicopters. Further cuts to DM46 billion are expected 
in 1997. 157 
Another area where European countries perceive they are deficient 
is space-based intelligence. France has one satellite, Helios-1A, but 
it is an optical device and cannot see through cloud cover. The 
follow on Helios-2, scheduled for launch in 2002, was to be a joint 
venture between Germany and France. As of July 1996 Germany may pull 
out of the $2.1 billion project because of their own budget cuts and 
instead move toward closer German-US cooperation. "German defense 
minister Volker Ruhe warned in an interview with the newspaper Bild Am 
Sonntag that he would have no money to build the satellite because of 
federal belt-tightening. " 158 
France is currently planning to build a new series of satellites 
in the early part of the next century, although it remains to be seen 
if they can go it alone. In the area of high-technology communication 
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satellites, Western Europe is also dependent on U.S. support. Of the 
48 satellite channels used by NATO in Bosnia, 46 belonged to the 
United States . 159 
In 1990 France was spending a third of its equipment budget on its 
nuclear forces (force de frappe) but in five years that sum has 
dropped to a fifth, or just over Ffr20 billion. Experts believe 
France will shortly go further by dropping its Ffr60 billion programme 
to build the M5 nuclear missile for its fleet of SSBNs after the year 
2010. 16° France is scrapping the land portion of its nuclear force by 
removing the 18 nuclear missiles it has stationed on the 
Plateaud'Albion in southern France. "Jacques Boyon, a close associate 
of Chirac and head of the parliamentary defense committee. Conceded 
that because of France's finances we can no longer afford three 
nuclear components. " 161 
France has seemed to say that realistically it can no longer 
afford to be an autonomous nuclear power. This could also show the 
increasing perception that nuclear deterrence is not as important 
today as during the cold war. With decreasing budgets and increasing 
reliance on conventional weapons the relatively expensive nuclear 
forces will be the losers in the quest for funds no matter what 
prestige they bring. 
One way for Western European countries to cut costs is for each 
159 Atkinson and Graham. 
160
"Country Briefing, France," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 
24. 
161 J. Lewis, "Plateaud' Albion: Old Before its Time," Jane's Defense Weekly 24, 
no. 16 (21 Oct 1995), 26. 
76 
country to specialize in the defense industrial area in which it has 
de-facto leadership. Experts point out that the German Leopard 2 Main 
Battle Tank is the de-facto tank standard in Europe, While The UK has 
the edge in Military aircraft and France in Airbus, Eurocopter and 
Euro-Missile systems. Possible cooperation in this area is impaired 
by strong French insistence that they must preserve as much of their 
national industrial base as possible. 162 There is also the problem 
that Germany currently has much stronger arms export laws than France 
and requires the approval of its Federal Security Council in order to 
export certain military weapons systems. 163 This has had the effect of 
putting a halt to any increases in this type of cooperation. 
One way Western European countries may get access to military 
assets is the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which 
were agreed to in principle at the 1994 NATO Summit. This would free 
assets for use by European members in military operations in which the 
U.S. does not want to participate. This arrangement immediately 
brings up a problem that may become more apparent because of NATO's 
change to a more global outlook. There is the possibility that the 
U.S. will veto any use of NATO assets for a European only mission, if 
it is not perceived as in the U.S.'s interests. The opposite may also 
become true, perhaps because of the increased European control of 
NATO. In any operation where the U.S. is involved and is large enough 
where NATO forces are required to augment American forces, the assets 
162
"Country Briefing, Germany," Jane's Defense Weekly (20 Mar 1996), 25. 
163This has in the past led to certain types of arms industry cooperation, the Euro-
missile is one example. The arms that are to be exported are predominately built in 
France. 
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may not be made available for use by the United States. The European 
members of NATO may not be willing to send their assets outside of 
Europe if they see the mission as not in their best interests. 
G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY 
The changing demographics in France and Germany are affecting 
the ability of those countries to restructure their military forces to 
meet the requirements of the post-Cold War environment. It will also 
have an effect on the willingness of France and Germany to take part 
in any future military operations in which the United States would 
like their support. While demographics are not the only variables 
affecting these outcomes, they must be taken into account because 
their impact will grow larger and more pronounced in the future. 
Because these problems deal with Western European domestic policy and 
the sovereignty of a country to set its own agenda, this is an area 
where the U.S. will be very limited in its power to affect the 
policies established by other countries. 
Demography is also contributing to the economic hardships of less 
developed nations, in this case the North African countries, which 
will in turn affect Western Europe. This has lead to resentment 
against the comparatively richer European nations. In the future, as 
the gap in incomes widens further, there may be an increase in 
political confrontation between the "have" nations and "have nots." 
While Western Europe is not in danger of being militarily invaded by 
its regional neighbors, there is the possibility of increased 
confrontation in the Mediterranean region. This would likely be in 
the form of mass movements of war refugees and increased terrorism, by 
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both small independent factions and state sponsored groups. This will 
cause France and Germany to pay increasingly more attention to this 
area. 
The increasing probability of growing conflict in the 
Mediterranean region and the possibility that it could affect Europe, 
has caused some Western European countries to provide more mili tary164 
and economic resources to that area. Western European countries are 
also looking toward the future and are calling for NATO to provide 
increased military assets in the Southern European region in the hope 
that they can prevent or if not prevent at least deal with the 
potential conflicts. 
The ability of France and Germany to provide more forces with 
which to contribute to international military operations in the future 
will increase. This is mainly a result of their force restructuring, 
although also partly because of France's ending of conscription and 
Germany's increased willingness to deploy troops outside of its own 
country. The plans to restructure their militaries and provide a 
smaller, more mobile and professional core force will give them a 
rapid reaction force capable of being deployed quickly to foreign 
conflicts. This type of force was for the most part not needed during 
the Cold War and the results were.seen in France's inability to field 
an effective force in Iraq during the Desert Storm campaign. 
The restructuring of their armed forces is a reaction to the 
nations' post-Cold War security situation, political considerations 
164A prime example ofthis is the creation in 1995 ofthe EUROFORand 
EUROMARFOR by four of the Southern European countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
France. 
79 
and their own budgetary constraints. After the changes have taken 
effect, France and Germany will have more troops available for 
deployment overseas than in prior years in support of NATO, UN and WEU 
operations even though they will have lower overall force numbers. 
However, there remains the question of how many of the planned 50,000-
to 60,000-man force will be actual combat troops. Included in the 
above number will be Army, Naval and Air Force personnel with the 
requisite support and other non-combat troops. 
What is also in doubt is Western Europe's ability to provide 
transportation to the area of operations and its ability to continue 
to support the force once it reaches the destination. Because of lack 
of money to rebuild their military infrastructure - transport, space-
based intelligence, logistic capabilities - and the likelihood of 
static or falling defense spending in the future, France and Germany 
will be reliant on the U.S. for support in these areas for the 
foreseeable future. 
Other considerations are the political aspects, which can not be 
foretold, but only planned for. In the future will France and Germany 
be willing to commit troops to conflicts outside of the European 
continent if their public perceives that there are more pressing 
problems closer to home; and if so will they be willing or able to pay 
the large amounts of money needed to use troops far from home? 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States is relying on its allies to provide troops and 
support for military operations not just in Western Europe, but also 
worldwide. This thesis has discussed factors that may lead France or 
Germany not to support or not to be able to provide support to the 
U.S. in future conflict situations. 
Because France and Germany are both feeling the pressures of their 
domestic problems coupled with the fact that the end of the Cold War 
has removed the largest threat to their security, there are signs that 
they will not cooperate as strongly with the U.S. as they have in the 
past. The U.S. may have to accept the Europeans taking an 
increasingly Europe-first stance instead of a larger Western view. 
There also remains the chance that if nationalism continues to grow 
stronger, the European integration process will be stalled or even 
reversed. Europe may then return to something similar to a pre-World 
War One type of arrangement. 
Bosnia and the Dayton peace accords have shown that there is a 
wide gap between European goals and capabilities. It has also shown 
that Europe does not have the capabilities or resources to provide for 
its own security and that U.S. military power is indispensable. While 
NATO is changing its mission to include out-of-area operations, except 
for the smallest missions the U.S. will have to bear the brunt of the 
cost and manpower. As these missions move farther away from the 
Western European area, the more important will be the role of the U.S. 
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The U.S. should not expect France and Germany to increase their 
defense spending any time in the near future. If their domestic costs 
continue to increase, as they will have to without social welfare 
reforms, the amount available to be spent on defense may decrease 
instead. Without a clear threat, there will be increased public 
pressure not to cut the social welfare programs that Western Europeans 
have gotten used to and, as seen in the past, are willing to defy 
their governments in order to keep. 
At this time Western European countries are attempting to change 
their force structures in order to compete in the new post-Cold War 
security situation. Because of the long lead times inherent in 
building up military forces coupled with their defense industry 
problems and inefficient procurement processes, France and Germany 
will likely remain deficient in the military support areas for the 
foreseeable future. These areas include troop transport, logistics 
support and space-based assets (communication and intelligence). 
Their lack of power projection also means that in any place without 
pre-located military bases, the United States will have to provide the 
initial beach heads for any allied forces. 
A. OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS 
The Western European responses to out-of-area missions may be 
affected by both their domestic problems and lack of resources. The 
fact remains that NATO missions can be vetoed by a single negative 
vote of any one of its sixteen members. This may leave the U.S. to 
act without France and Germany in areas outside of Europe, and force 
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it to look more toward building regional allies. It may also force 
the U.S. not only to act unilaterally, but may mean that America will 
be increasingly alone politically if France and Germany have different 
objectives. 
France has shown its reluctance to intervene in Middle East 
conflicts because of its large Muslim population. This reluctance may 
increase in the future as a result of a lack of assimilation of this 
minority and the fact that the Muslim population will grow as a 
percentage of the total population. 
Increased domestic economic pressures can also not be discounted 
as a source of French and German reluctance to take part in future 
Middle East missions. Western Europe is more reliant on Middle East 
trade than the U.S. If Western Europeans perceive that they will lose 
more than they could gain by antagonizing Middle East governments, 
they may not risk losing those economic relations. This could lead 
Western European governments not only to decline sending troops but 
also not to support the U.S. politically. 
As the operations move further away from Western Europe to 
Southern Asia and the Far East, France and Germany may not have the 
resources to contribute more than a nominal force. While they are 
building up rapid reaction forces of 50,000 to 60,000 men, the actual 
combat potential of these units will be much less than the totals. 
The ability and/or willingness for France and Germany to pay for a 
deployment of this type will also become more doubtful as their 
domestic spending increases. There is the potential that public 
pressure to stay out of any costly and far removed conflict will keep 
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any military support at the bare minimum and possibly only as a token 
gesture. 
B. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
Western European realization that the U.S. is indispensable for 
its security needs leads to the conclusion that Europe has no 
alternative than to accept the U.S. lead in defense matters. The 
French goal of setting up an independent European defense entity that 
will be capable of providing for European security is not a reality at 
this time and will not be until Western Europeans can commit to spend 
the needed money on defense. It does not seem likely that the Western 
European politicians will be willing to risk massive public dissension 
by decreasing public social welfare with a simultaneous increase in 
military spending. 
There is also the possibility that the new global orientation of 
NATO will not become a viable concept. The reality is that France and 
Germany can not afford to pay the costs of being part of a global 
force now and will be even less so in the future. The U.S. will still 
have to provide the lion's share of costs and manpower in any 
operation outside of Europe. 
More important than costs is the probability that, on a global 
scale, European objectives may be different than those of the U.S. 
Differences in foreign policy may come as a result of economic 
matters, public pressures or internal minority activism. Because of 
these differences, NATO may become frozen in its ability to act, 
leaving the United States to make the decision as to whether it will 
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take action. In future conflicts outside Europe, the U.S. may have to 
make its decision based not on how much support Western Europe will 
provide, but whether it can get enough regional allies to act with it 
or if it has the ability to act alone. 
If faced with a major non-European regional conflict, with the 
U.S. not able to gather enough regional allies and world support to 
take action and ensure victory, the U.S. may be reluctant to act 
unilaterally. By not getting involved in such a conflict the U.S. may 
be viewed as disengaging from the region or unable to intervene 
militarily in support of its own stated security interests. This would 
be a major setback in regional security and could be viewed as a 
victory by the aggressor in the conflict, thus leading to greater 
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